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PREDICTION MARKETS: A REVIEW WITH AN 






Prediction markets generally are small-scale electronic markets that tie payoffs to 
measurable future events. They are similar to stock markets, where the ―stocks‖ are 
outcomes or events rather than shares in a company. The growing popularity of 
prediction markets reflects the notion that markets are an excellent means of efficient 
information aggregation among a disparate group of people. Trading prices in the 
prediction markets provide decision makers with a timely, accurate, and continuously 
updated picture on the likelihood of future events. This enables decision makers to better 
evaluate risk. Based on historical successes in prediction market utilization, it is both 
logical and important to assess the usefulness of prediction markets in contributing to 
critical elements of Navy total force shaping.  
Navy Manpower, Personnel, Training, and Education (N1) regularly forecasts re-
enlistment rates, over/under endstrength, and many other force-shaping factors as an 
input into their resource allocation decision-making process. In an effort to improve upon 
the force-shaping decision-making process, N1 has shown interest in using prediction 
markets to complement or replace alternative methods for forecasting various Navy 
force-shaping elements.  
The aim of this thesis is to act as a foundation for ongoing prediction market 
research within the Department of Defense (DoD). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE 
Prediction markets generally are small-scale electronic markets that tie payoffs to 
measurable future events. They are similar to stock markets, where the ―stocks‖ are 
outcomes or events rather than shares in a company. Private firms are using prediction 
markets to help forecast key events, such as the success of new products, future 
profitability, or mergers/acquisitions within their industry. Prediction markets also have 
been popular as an alternative to polls or surveys. The growing popularity of prediction 
markets reflects the notion that markets are an excellent means of efficient and effective 
information aggregation among a disparate and diverse group of people. The strength of 
prediction markets is that they aggregate knowledge in a clever way, allowing people to 
digest other people‘s information and make their own decision based upon the new 
information, vice simply averaging survey responses. The trading prices in the prediction 
markets provide decision makers with a timely, accurate, and continuously updated 
picture on the likelihood of future events. This enables decision makers to evaluate risk, 
and it provides an early warning of possible problems and needed policy changes. Based 
on private and commercial successes in prediction market utilization, it is both logical 
and important to assess the usefulness of prediction markets in contributing to critical 
elements of Navy total force shaping.  
Navy Manpower, Personnel, Training, and Education (N1) regularly forecasts 
future attrition rates, re-enlistment rates, over/under strength, and many other force-
shaping factors as an input into their resource allocation decision-making process. N1 
relies on historically based econometrics in tandem with quick-poll data to forecast force-
shaping estimates. Econometrics models, however, often produce incorrect predictions.  
To improve upon the force-shaping decision-making process, N1 has shown 
interest in using prediction markets to replace or complement quick-polls and 
econometrics for various aspects of force-shaping forecasting. The significant potential of 
prediction markets lies in their ability to efficiently and accurately aggregate current 
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information in any economic environment. Furthermore, prediction markets may offer 
potential cost-savings against methods such as polling. 
The objectives of this research paper are: 1) to consolidate previous prediction 
market literature to provide a thorough description and assessment of prediction market 
benefits, limitations, and design and implementation; and 2) to consider the feasibility of 
utilizing prediction markets as alternative forecasting measures for Navy organizational 
leadership decision making. As part of these objectives, we address the following issues 
throughout: 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. What are the key benefits and potential limitations of prediction markets? 
2. What does the current literature and practical evidence suggest about 
 prediction market use as a forecasting tool? 
3. Can prediction markets be an effective tool for Navy force-shaping 
 forecasting? 
4. In what areas should the Navy consider using a prediction market? 
5. In conducting a pilot prediction market, what lessons learned can we 
 provide to the Navy regarding the design, implementation, and utilization 
 of prediction markets? 
C. METHODOLOGY 
This research provides a thorough review and overview of previous prediction 
market literature. Furthermore, it underscores the key benefits and limitations of 
prediction markets, discusses when prediction markets are best utilized, and addresses 
their critical design and implementation issues. To better understand the intricacies 
associated with market design and implementation, a practical experimental prediction 
market was conducted. Finally, using the research and experimental lessons learned as a 
basis, this thesis offers recommendations on the potential forecasting usefulness of 
prediction markets for critical elements of Navy total force-shaping strategy and policies.  
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D.  LIMITATIONS 
This research project is limited in scope and breadth due to time and participatory 
constraints associated with designing and conducting an experimental prediction market. 
Furthermore, the experiment‘s participant pool perhaps was not as broad and diverse as 
preferred for a market of such specificity. Finally, due to time and budget constraints, it 
was not feasible to ensure all participants were trained properly and collectively on the 
concept and nuances of prediction markets.1  
                                                 
1 Multiple anonymous post-market survey responses indicate that several initial participants ceased 
participation due to a lack of understanding. This likely is a result of improper participant training. 
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II. PREDICTION MARKETS SYNOPSIS 
This introduction provides an overview of prediction markets and serves as a 
prediction market primer for future practitioners. Prediction markets (also known as 
information, electronic or decision markets) are proposed as an alternative forecasting 
means for predicting future events. The idea is for prediction markets to supplement 
existing forecasting techniques, such as quantitative and judgmental methods, when these 
techniques are unsuitable for predicting future events. 
Quantitative and judgmental forecasting methods have limitations. Quantitative 
methods rely on historical data. These statistical methods are invalid when organizations 
simply have not collected the historical data needed to predict future events or the 
fundamental nature of the operating environment shifts radically and invalidates implicit 
assumptions. These situations render quantitative forecasts meaningless. Similarly, 
judgmental methods also have practical limitations. The Delphi and judgmental 
bootstrapping methods are the most prominent judgmental forecasting methods and 
combine the opinions of experts. However, identifying experts, garnering their 
participation, and making sense of conflicting subjective opinions can be a herculean task 
(Ashton & Ashton, 1985; Batchelor & Dua, 1995). These practical limitations provide an 
opportunity for an alternative forecasting method. 
A. DEFINITION 
Prediction markets do not have a universal name or definition. However, an 
extended literature review of prediction markets by Tziralis & Tatsiopoulos (2007) chose 
this definition based upon a definition by Berg, Nelson, and Rietz (2003): 
Prediction markets are defined as markets that are designed and run for the 
primary purpose of mining and aggregating information scattered among 
traders and subsequently using this information in the form of market 
values in order to make predictions about specific future events. (p. 1) 
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B. THEORY 
Friedrich Hayek‘s article ―The Use of Knowledge in Society‖ (1945) describes 
the theoretical superiority of aggregating widely dispersed information versus relying 
solely on statistical algorithms or experts. Hayek emphasizes the intrinsic value of 
implicit information, what is now referred to as tacit knowledge. Simply put, it takes time 
to learn how to perform a job well even after receiving formal, theoretical education. 
Additionally, he argues from a resource allocation perspective that a centralized planning 
office cannot meet the efficiency of an open market because the individuals only know a 
very small amount compared to the collective knowledge of society. Therefore, a 
decentralized economic structure complements the dispersed nature of information spread 
throughout society (p. 520). Additionally, he challenged himself and his peers to find a 
method of pulling together this knowledge from the disparate sources.  
Prediction markets are based upon the notion of collective intelligence. James 
Surowiecki‘s book The Wisdom of Crowds re-popularized Hayek‘s ideas in 2004. The 
book presents a case that, under the right circumstances, the collective knowledge of a 
group can be superior to the smartest individual members of the group. Surowiecki states 
four criteria are required for groups to demonstrate collective intelligence (2004, pp. 
XVIII–XIX): 
 Diversity of opinion 
 Member independence 
 Decentralization 
 A mechanism to aggregate opinions 
Prediction markets are proven information aggregation mechanisms. Moreover, 
previous empirical evidence supports the position that prediction markets are more 
accurate than quantitative and judgmental methods at predicting the likelihood of future 
events. Herein lies the competitive advantage for prediction markets. Subsequent chapters 
discuss prediction market accuracy in greater depth.  
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C. PREDICTION MARKET ANATOMY 
This section will provide a brief framework to increase readers‘ understanding 
regarding how prediction markets work. This will serve as a brief introduction to some of 
the design factors and terminology; however, these concepts will be covered in detail in 
subsequent chapters.2 
1. Design Factors 
a. Claim Definition 
The claim definition is the question or statement posed to the marketplace 
traders. The claim definition must account for all possible outcomes. 
b. Claim Structure 
The claim structure is the means of assigning the associated payoff to 
market traders. There are three main types of claim structures. 
(1) Winner-take-all  
 Pays out $1 if a specific event occurs 
 Pays $0 otherwise 
 This claim structure is useful for determining the probability of whether an 
event will or will not occur.  
(2) Index 
 Contract pays out the value of a specific future event 
 This claim structure is useful for determining the mean value of the 
market‘s expectation of a continuous number range. 
(3) Spread 
 Amount of bet is fixed 
 Market trades based on cutoffs that determine whether event occurs 
 This claim structure is useful for determining the median expected 
probability that an event will or will not occur. 
                                                 
2 A focused discussion on each design topic below is provided in Chapter V. 
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c. Trading Mechanisms 
The market trading mechanism is what determines market conduct among 
all participants; it is that which connects buyers and sellers for market trading. There are 
three common trading mechanisms: 
(1) Continuous Double Auction (CDA)  
 Person-to-person trading 
(2) Market Scoring Rules (MSR)  
 Mathematical algorithm to facilitate liquidity by use of an automated 
market maker3 
 Maintains a probability distribution across all possible events 
(3) Dynamic Pari-mutuel (DPM)  
 Mathematical algorithm to facilitate liquidity by use of an automated 
market maker 
 Operates based on a price function that reflects a continuously updated 
probability for a given event‘s occurrence 
d. Participation 
Active and productive participation is an essential element of prediction 
markets. Wider participation pools generally provide a greater knowledge base than do 
narrow participation pools. Thin markets exist when there are few participants and/or 
participants do not actively participate in such a way to ensure continuous trading occurs. 
Thin markets are a limitation of prediction markets. Prediction market designers hope for 
thick markets. 
e. Real Money, Play Money and Associated Incentives 
Incentives can be useful for enticing participants who otherwise would not 
engage in the prediction market. Cash incentives are most commonly associated with real 
money markets. Play money markets are among the most prevalent for public and 
                                                 
3 Automated market makers are explained in subsequent chapters; refer to page 42 for a more thorough 
discussion, under Trading Mechanisms. 
  9 
professional use. These markets usually provide some initial endowment of play money. 
Generally, play money markets rely on the use of other incentives, such as prizes or 
points, to elicit participation (Chen, 2005). 
D. HOW PREDICTION MARKETS WORK 
In finance, the efficient-market hypothesis posits open financial markets 
efficiently aggregate all available information into market prices. These market prices 
reflect all known information and quickly respond to new information leading to a 
change in price. Organizations are applying this concept to aggregate organizational 
information by using their disparate and diverse stakeholder group as prediction market 
traders. Thus, prediction markets offer a real-time mechanism to aggregate this 
fragmented information for organizations to use it to their advantage. The commodities 
traded are claims about future events in which the market prices represent a real-time, 
consensus probability about the event's likelihood of occurrence. The market also 
provides a historical context in which one may see how individual and collective 
opinions have changed over time.   
In general, the trading price depends on the joint distribution of the traders‘ 
beliefs, budgets and risk preferences (Manski, 2006). Budgets are intuitively less of a 
consideration when the market uses play money as currency. Similarly, play money 
traders may be more apt to take risks that they otherwise would not take with real money. 
Fortunately, empirical evidence suggests the accuracy of prediction markets using play 
money is comparable to real money prediction markets (Servan-Schreiber, Wolfers, 
Pennock, & Galebach, 2004). This same study concludes that the use of real money is not 
critical but is one of many ways to motivate well-informed people to trade in the market 
(p. 250).  
The evidence is mixed on the issue of market accuracy when using real versus 
play money. Rosenbloom and Notz (2006) conducted another study in response to the 
aforementioned study‘s assertion that play money market accuracy is comparable to real 
money market accuracy. Although they found that both real and play money markets 
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provide reasonably accurate forecasts, their major claim is ―that real money markets are 
significantly more accurate than play money markets when forecasting non-sports 
events‖ (p. 63).  
Trading prices do not simply reflect an average assessment by the group, but also 
reflect the degree of confidence the different members of the group have in their 
estimates (Levmore, 2003). These markets provide an estimate of the probability 
distribution of the event coming true via the range of trader bets. More impressively, 
markets using market scoring rules4 aggregate information and provide a joint probability 
distribution over many variables by allowing bets on the value combinations of each 
dependent variable (Hanson, 2003). In other words, prediction markets using a market 
scoring rule mechanism can provide probabilities for events with multiple mutually 
exclusive dependent variables.  
Since traders participate on a voluntary basis in a prediction market, those who 
participate tend to have information relevant to the particular prediction (Abramowicz, 
2007). Additionally, traders in the market have an incentive to trade at their earliest 
opportunity upon the discovery of new information before the market has fully priced the 
new information (Abramowicz, 2007, p. 17). Confident traders have the ability to 
speculate, and thus move the trading price closer to the actual probability of the event 
coming true. Therefore, informed, confident traders are progressively more likely to 
determine trading prices (Abramowicz, 2007, p. 7). 
The mere mention of market speculation naturally leads to a discussion of 
manipulation. Subsequent chapters more fully discuss the risk of manipulation. 
Additionally, those chapters will present empirical evidence that dismisses the effect of 
manipulation on prediction market accuracy. However, the next paragraph discusses 
manipulation from a theoretical perspective. 
Prediction market manipulation is a potential danger, just as it is in financial 
markets. However, the motivation for traders to manipulate is not nearly as high as it is in 
financial markets, especially if the prediction market uses play money as currency. The 
                                                 
4 Market scoring rules are discussed further in Chapter V. 
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key is that if traders are aware, in advance, that other traders have incentives to 
manipulate, they will counteract their manipulation attempts by seeking to push prices in 
the opposite direction. From a market efficiency perspective, a greater incentive exists for 
higher participation by informed traders in markets in which traders are not trading 
according to market fundamentals (Abramowicz, 2007, p. 31).  The informed traders can 
take advantage of the uninformed traders for an easy profit. The upside to the market is 
that the additional insight by the informed market entrants should increase market 
accuracy. Thus, attempts to manipulate the market may actually increase market accuracy 
(Hanson & Oprea, 2009, p. 304).  
Whereas insider trading is illegal in the financial markets, it is encouraged in 
prediction markets. Thus, decision makers are afforded access to information possessed 
by employees with ―hidden profiles‖—those who would otherwise not reveal their 
information because of the nature of their personality or hierarchical constraints (Dye, 
2008, p.89).  
In summary, the trading prices provide decision makers with a continuously 
updated picture on the likelihood of future events. This enables decision makers to 
evaluate risk and make informed resource allocation decisions. Ultimately, the power of 
prediction markets is that they provide incentives to the traders who discover new 
information and truthfully reveal it while the market provides a mechanism for 
aggregating trader opinions (Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 2004).  
E. APPLICATIONS 
1. Past and Current Applications 
 The first electronic application of prediction markets was the Iowa Presidential 
Stock Market. In 1988, University of Iowa economists designed this market to predict the 
outcome of U.S. presidential elections. In 1992, these same economists presented their 
first academic findings that suggested these markets were a good information aggregation 
mechanism (Forsythe, Nelson, Neumann, & Wright, 1992). These early studies laid the 
foundation for prediction markets to be used by others as an information aggregation 
mechanism.   
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The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) was involved with, 
perhaps, the most publicized government prediction market experiment to date. In July 
2003, the Futures Markets Applied to Prediction (FutureMap) program was intended to 
explore the power of prediction markets to aggregate information to thwart future 
terrorist attacks. Politicians and journalists opposed the FutureMap program idea in the 
media. They publicly attacked DARPA on the grounds that it was unethical and in bad 
taste to place wagers on the fate of foreign leaders and the likelihood of terrorist attacks 
(Looney, 2003). Thus, DARPA cancelled the FutureMap program on July 29, 2003, the 
day after it was announced (DARPA, 2003, July 29). 
The FutureMap program never got the Policy Analysis Market (PAM) out of the 
planning phase. Thus, it was never operational. However, at least one analysis has found 
that it would have been self-defeating (Richey, 2005). The argument is that PAM could 
be effective if it only attempted to predict terrorist attacks. However, the predictions 
surely would have been acted upon to attempt to prevent the predicted terrorist attacks. 
This prevention action would subsequently reduce the chance of the event occurring. This 
would be an excellent collective outcome if it indeed led to the prevention of a terrorist 
attack; however, it would undermine the self-interested traders‘ attempts toward 
individual profit by reducing the chances of the event occurrence (Richey, 2005). Applied 
to other prediction markets, this phenomenon can also exist if a decision-maker changes 
course based upon the prediction market forecast.      
Some businesses, especially in the technology and pharmaceutical industries, 
have had a high degree of success employing prediction markets. These companies have 
used internal prediction markets to forecast quarterly sales with better accuracy than their 
forecasting departments. Google has used prediction markets to determine how many 
people will use their applications, such as Gmail (Dye, 2008, p. 87). They have been able 
to make resource allocation decisions such as server capacity to support this number of 
users. Similarly, pharmaceutical companies have used prediction markets to determine 
which drugs in their experimental process have the best chance for approval by the  
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Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Thus, they are able to make resource allocation 
decisions based on those drugs that have the highest probability of successfully making it 
to market.  
Table 1 details client organizations, the type of prediction market they are using 
and their purpose from one prediction market provider, namely Spigit. Businesses 
employ prediction markets to aid their forecasting. Some examples are product delivery 
dates, product uptake rates, manufacturing capacity needs, product ideas, marketing 
campaigns and competitive actions. Similarly, the government and its agencies may be 
able to use prediction markets for public policy and decision-making. 
Table 1.   Spigit Prediction Market Use Cases (From Spigit, n.d.) 
 
2. Future Applicability 
Organizations looking to improve their forecasting of contentious issues are likely 
to benefit from prediction markets. The prediction market acts as not only a mechanism 
by which many people can state their beliefs, but also shows how strongly people feel 
about their particular belief(s) in a quantitative fashion. If so inclined, the other 
participants are able to adjust their opinions based upon the rationale of other traders. As 
this cycle continues, participants provide a comprehensive rationale for the disparate 
viewpoints within the group.  
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Organizations considering using prediction markets should start with pilot 
programs so they can compare the results with traditional forecasting techniques. A 
learning curve will occur as organizations determine which circumstances and 
participants are most likely to result in accurate forecasts.  
Prediction markets are unlikely to be useful when: 
 Outcomes have a high degree of predictability 
 There is not any dispersed information to aggregate 
 There are only a limited number of knowledgeable traders. 
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III. BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS 
Prediction markets are powerful and efficient forecasting tools that organizations 
can use under a multitude of external conditions. Prediction markets carry with them 
several key benefits and potential limitations, which organizations must fully understand 
and appreciate to utilize prediction markets effectively. This chapter examines the most 
critical of those benefits and limitations and provides greater insight and supporting 
evidence for each in relation to use within a Navy context.  
A. KEY BENEFITS 
Prediction markets have a proven record of accomplishment in the corporate 
context. Such a record comes only from years of effort, challenge, error, perseverance, 
and insight. The insight resulting from previous experimental and practical applications 
is, perhaps, most valuable from the preceding list. It is this insight that develops and 
reinforces understanding in the ways prediction markets ought to be used. Moreover, it is 
this insight that develops and reinforces understanding of the various strengths and 
capabilities of prediction markets. The following three sections examine and reflect upon 
the key benefits of prediction markets: their dynamic nature, accuracy, and potential for 
anonymous revelations.5 
1. Dynamic Nature 
A major advantage of a prediction market is its dynamic nature. Prediction 
markets generally are capable of continually aggregating information, keeping market 
managers well informed as to the group's fluctuating collective belief on the probability 
of a given event's occurrence. The prime advantage to a prediction market's dynamic 
nature lies in a prediction market's ability to reflect participants' collective beliefs in light 
of external environmental impacts, such as significant fluctuations in the public stock 
markets, the likelihood of war, key political elections, changes in public or private policy, 
                                                 
5 This is the act of revealing or extracting information while protecting participant identities. 
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as well as numerous other possibilities. Tziralis and Tatsiopoulos (2007) captured the 
spirit of this notion and went further with the following excerpt: 
In contrast to traditional approaches, the operation of the prediction 
market is not affected at all by possible changes in types and sources of 
information or even the number of inputs or participants. Prediction 
markets are by nature able to transform unlimited amounts of timely and 
locally dispread qualitative information into accurate quantitative forecasts 
about the future. (p. 257) 
The dynamic nature also enhances efficiency. As Tziralis and Tatsiopoulos 
observe, ―Some of the most difficult steps in a typical forecasting application are to mine, 
namely to collect, merge and clean relevant data from human experts‖ (2007, p. 256). 
With that, prediction markets are an excellent mechanism for accomplishing and 
overcoming such tasks. Moreover, some evidence suggests that because of their dynamic 
nature, prediction markets can provide increasingly improved forecasts over time. This 
generally is indicative of the information improving over time; in other words, prediction 
market participants become better informed and more adept at using the markets and 
more fully embrace their capabilities. Overall, this leads to improved forecasting over 
time. In 2008, McKinsey Quarterly convened a roundtable to discuss key issues relating 
to prediction markets and their use in the corporate environment. Among the panelists 
was Bo Cowgill, Google's product manager, who is a leading individual in implementing 
and managing prediction markets within Google. Mr. Cowgill offered the following 
observation that supports the ideas above: 
The longer you work at Google and the longer you trade in the prediction 
markets, [. . .] the likelier you are to have a successful trading record. [. . .] 
The market as a whole got smarter [. . .], and we could observe a steady 
improvement over time. (Dye, 2008, p. 88) 
2. Accuracy 
Accuracy is a principle advantage of prediction markets. Prediction markets can 
quickly pull together information spread across many people and places, and the accuracy 
of the results can rival most any alternative forecasting method under optimal conditions. 
Tziralis and Tatsiopoulos (2007) affirm this belief: 
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The forecast accuracy of an efficient prediction market is, under the 
condition of efficiency, optimum. In practice, prediction markets usually 
tend to perform at least as well as the single best individual, without 
requiring knowledge of who that individual is in advance. (p. 256) 
Not only can prediction markets match the accuracy of experts and alternate 
forecasting methods, prediction markets are capable of surpassing these measures under 
the right conditions. Furthermore, prediction markets have accurately performed across a 
variety of dynamic event subjects: from political polling to corporate performance goals, 
and from important Wall Street news to the latest Hollywood releases (Servan-Schreiber, 
Wolfers, Pennock, & Galebach, 2004, p. 244). In supporting this idea, Robin Hanson 
(2003) cites several specific examples that illustrate prediction market accuracy: Iowa 
Electronic Markets (IEM) forecasts repeatedly outperformed opinion polls on various 
U.S. presidential elections; Hewlett-Packard markets bested traditional printer sales 
forecasts in 75% of the observances; and prediction markets outperformed four of five 
expert columnists in selecting the 2000 Oscar winners (p. 107). 
Aside from their ability to improve upon alternate forecasting methods, prediction 
markets also are capable of accurately incorporating information more quickly than other 
methods. For instance, one might assume that a prediction market on a given presidential 
election would follow the lead of traditional polls. However, Forsythe, Nelson, Neumann, 
and Wright (as cited in Abramowicz, 2003, p. 18) contend that analysis of the 1988 IEM 
highlights that traders conducted trades based on information that was subsequently 
mirrored in the polls. In other words, traders accurately predicted changes to the 
candidates‘ expected voting returns based on information aside from traditional polls, and 
the ―poll results did not drive market prices‖ (Abramowicz, 2003, p. 18).6 This supports 
the idea that prediction markets are capable of aggregating given information more 
quickly than some alternative methods, ceteris paribus. Although the IEM case results 
above are not conclusive, they are intriguing, and they do offer supportive evidence on 
the performance capability of prediction markets. 
                                                 
6 In fairness, Abramowicz (2003) contrasts this point by citing a similar election study in the 
Netherlands that did not reach the above conclusion (pp. 18–19). 
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All told, the accuracy of prediction markets may not be superior to alternative 
forecasting methods. However, numerous studies and experiments repeatedly have shown 
prediction market accuracy at least approximates that of alternate methods. For instance, 
Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004) analyzed data from a TradeSports contract that paid out 
only if Saddam Hussein was removed from power by the end of June 2003; their analysis 
shows that the market price directly corresponded to both fluctuating oil prices and an 
expert journalist‘s estimate of the likelihood of a U.S.-Iraq military conflict (pp. 112–
113). 
Accuracy can suffer greatly in some cases, such as when participation is minimal, 
or when information is not readily available or easily interpreted by participants. In such 
instances, managers should view prediction market results with a skeptical eye. However, 
under desirable market conditions, prediction market accuracy likely will approximate 
that of alternative forecasting methods; thus, under such conditions, accuracy may not be 
the ultimate determinant of whether an organization should utilize prediction markets. 
Rather, the nature and amount of information desired, as well as organizational objectives 
may have a more prominent role in such a decision. Nonetheless, if various forecasting 
methods are considered for a given objective, an organization should closely examine the 
motivation, skill, and efficiency of its current forecasting experts. Generally, these 
experts will provide accurate and useful information. However, Abramowicz (2003) 
asserts there are times to believe prediction markets may provide greater efficiency or 
objectivity than expert forecasters: "It is in governmental decisionmaking [sic], however, 
where there is the greatest reason to be suspicious of experts, either because of external 
influence or because of ideological agendas‖ (pp. 20–21). For this reason, and others 
discussed throughout this thesis, prediction markets can befit government. 
3. Anonymous Revelations 
Another key benefit to prediction markets is their ability to aggregate information 
from, perhaps, otherwise unwilling participants. Often, employees find themselves 
choosing to withhold information about various aspects of their work. This withholding 
of information can be for any number of reasons, such as protecting their reputation, 
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character, or job out of fear of what a superior might do with the information. Moreover, 
some employees may withhold information to maintain an element of expert power or 
control. From an organizational behavior standpoint, such control may serve as leverage 
in maintaining status or exchanging reciprocal benefits among co-workers. Beyond this 
point, some employees act in a role that keeps them relatively hidden in terms of 
expressing opinions or beliefs on an organization's operations. Todd Henderson7 
describes this in the following way, ―. . . information can reside in . . . what academics 
call ‗hidden profiles.‘ These are people within an organization, who because of their 
personality or position in the hierarchy, won‘t have the incentive or wherewithal to reveal 
information‖ (Dye, 2008, p. 89). 
Prediction markets are an excellent means of bringing out sensitive knowledge 
and opinions. Through anonymity, prediction markets allow any employee to have an 
equal say by enabling hidden employees and shielding fearful or hesitant employees. 
Prediction markets can foster a spirit of participation by motivating employees to 
discover and share information, while breaking down personal or political organizational 
barriers (Tziralis & Tatsiopoulos, 2007, p. 257). 
B. POTENTIAL LIMITATIONS 
Because of years of hard work and research in this field, prediction markets are 
now better understood and their use is more reality than possibility. However, prediction 
markets are not without weaknesses. Just as experimental and practical application led to 
insights regarding the strong suits of prediction markets, such applications also led to 
insights regarding the shortcomings of prediction markets. The following four sections 
identify and expound upon the key potential limitations of prediction markets: issues 
associated with participation, manipulation, biases, and legal restrictions. 
                                                 
7 Todd Henderson served as a panelist on the McKinsey prediction market roundtable. At the time, he 
was an assistant professor of law at the University of Chicago Law School, with a background in law and 
economics. 
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1. Participation 
Active and productive participation is an essential element of prediction markets. 
Without active participation, a prediction market cannot realize its full potential, and 
organizations cannot tap into the associated benefits of prediction markets. Participation 
heavily hinges on potential participants‘ intrinsic interest or desire to participate, 
incentives used to elicit such participation, and even on participants‘ understanding of the 
prediction market and its associated questions of concern. According to James 
Surowiecki, ―One shortcoming is that a lot of people inside organizations don‘t find the 
market mechanism intuitive or easily understood. They find it very challenging to use, 
which limits the pool of people who participate‖ (Dye, 2008, p. 89). This can lead to a 
problem with attracting a diverse participant pool, and more specifically, a problem with 
attracting uninformed traders.8 Additionally, prediction markets are susceptible to an 
irrational participation problem in which rational traders have no further incentive or 
desire to trade once they already have hedged their bets (Hanson, 2003, p. 108). For these 
reasons, and others, prediction markets may become thin. The following sections discuss 
problems associated with thin markets and the inability to attract uninformed traders, as 
well the importance of participant training. 
a. Thin Markets 
Prediction markets require a sufficiently large and continuously active 
participant pool. The greater the number of traders and the more diverse the participant 
pool, the more likely a given prediction market will efficiently and accurately aggregate 
information. Moreover, such conditions generally are necessary to incite participants to 
discover or reveal new information pertinent to the market. Thin markets exist when there 
are few participants and/or participants do not actively participate in such a way to ensure 
continuous trading occurs. This does not suggest, however, that a market that reaches 
equilibrium is a thin market. Rather, a thin market is one that generally stagnates without 
reaching equilibrium.   
                                                 
8 Uninformed traders are those traders who do not possess legitimate or relevant information with 
respect to a given market. Uninformed traders are necessary to assure market liquidity. A more thorough 
discussion follows on page 22. 
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Thin markets can occur because of poor planning or minimal management 
support. Organizations are at risk of dooming any given prediction market from its 
inception when they implement a market without properly planning for the right number 
and demographic of respective participants. Thin markets also can result from market 
managers introducing too many questions into the marketplace, thereby allowing 
participants to dilute their limited trading resources. Additionally, when market managers 
introduce questions that require a high degree of specialization for forecasting purposes, 
such questions may attract a very limited number of participants. With limited 
participation, the last trade on a given prediction market likely will not be representative 
of the participants‘ collective belief on the probability of a given event‘s occurrence. This 
is possible because relevant information may be concentrated in only a few participants 
or in traders who already have hedged their bets in other markets (Abramowicz, 2003, p. 
24). 
A thin market generally leads to comparatively large price fluctuations, 
and it may not reach equilibrium—due to the lack of trading activity within the market. 
Price fluctuations often occur because of relative information asymmetry that exists 
among the various traders. In particular, increasing degrees of information asymmetry in 
double auction markets will lead to increased bid-ask spreads; as a result, participants 
will conduct trades less frequently (Abramowicz, 2003, p. 24). Robin Hanson (2003) 
offers the following example, ―Consider the case where a single person knows something 
about an event, and everyone else knows that they know nothing about that event. In this 
case, standard information markets based on that event simply cannot acquire this 
person‘s information‖ (p. 108). Due to the price fluctuations in thin markets, decision 
makers should not blindly trust short-term price spikes. Rather, decision makers should 
utilize a price smoothing method—such as averaging prices of a set number of days prior 
to the market‘s closing—to diminish effects of extreme price fluctuations prior to making 
subsequent decisions on the market‘s data (Abramowicz, 2003, p. 14). 
Although there are no straightforward solutions to thin markets, Hanson 
(2003) argues that market scoring rules can help correct problems associated with thin 
markets. Market scoring rules use a mathematical algorithm to avoid dependence upon 
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person-to-person trading—the algorithm updates market prices for a given market based 
on that market‘s trade history. Hanson‘s market scoring rules are discussed more fully in 
Chapter V. Additionally, Chapter VI reports observed aspects of Hanson‘s market 
scoring rules, as they act as a basis for Inkling‘s9 prediction market platform. 
b. Attracting Uninformed Traders 
As mentioned above, prediction markets require a relatively large and 
diverse group of active traders. Often, a critical issue with prediction markets is attracting 
both informed and uninformed traders. Informed traders are those who possess legitimate 
knowledge—knowledge that is not based purely on speculation or hearsay—with respect 
to a given prediction market; conversely, uninformed traders are those who do not 
possess such knowledge. Information can only be relayed and exchanged within a given 
market when some information gap exists. This existence of an information gap heavily 
relies on the presence of uninformed marketplace traders. According to Wolfers and 
Zitzewitz (2006), ―the success of the prediction market in generating trade depends 
critically on attracting uninformed traders‖ (p. 7). It should be noted that although 
organizations can attempt to ascertain or predetermine which traders are informed or 
uninformed, this cannot be simply determined. In fact, it is quite improbable that 
organizations will know which traders are informed until prediction market results are 
available. Nevertheless, organizations must make every effort to attract a sizeable and 
diverse participation pool, specifically to include uninformed traders. 
To attract uninformed traders, organizations must understand the 
underlying motivations of potential participants. Generally, the pure thrill of competition 
and the side effect of personal entertainment is enough to pique some potential 
participants‘ interests. Competitiveness, overconfidence, and entertainment are intrinsic 
values that many humans share; organizations will do well to tap into these natural 
sources of motivation to develop an efficient and liquid market (Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 
2006, pp. 7–9). 
                                                 
9 Our experimental pilot marketplace used Inkling‘s platform. This is discussed more fully in Chapter 
VI of this thesis. 
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However, incentives are likely necessary to draw in a fully diverse and 
sufficiently large body of participants. Prediction market experts support this point 
widely, and it is highlighted in Chapter VII. Organizations must appropriately match 
incentives to the participant pool, and they must fully consider the way(s) in which they 
should incentivize participants. For instance, if organizations only reward the highest 
earner for a given period or market, many participants may stop trading once they no 
longer have a chance to contend for the reward. Conversely, some participants may make 
large investments in unlikely outcomes to have a chance at becoming the highest 
earner—this of course leads to market inefficiency and affects overall market accuracy. 
Beyond considering who and when to reward, organizations must also consider the types 
and nature of rewards. This last aspect can become quite challenging, and it may require 
a great deal of creativity to keep the marketplace fresh, fun, and interesting. Jeff 
Severts10, Best Buy‘s prediction market pundit, shared the following regarding the 
challenges of attracting and incentivizing participants: 
You always have to be marketing them [prediction markets], just like 
everything else. [. . .] Every quarter, you have to refresh your list of prizes 
and try to come up with something at least as compelling as the last time. 
(Dye, 2008, p. 89) 
To close, the participation issue cannot be overemphasized here, and it 
certainly cannot be overlooked upon implementation. Participation is the most critical 
aspect in the practical application of prediction markets. Regardless of who sponsors a 
given market or what questions managers ask, a prediction market has little chance of 
aggregating information effectively if appropriate incentives do not exist or the 
participant pool is not appropriately diversified. 
                                                 
10 Jeff Severts served as a panelist on the McKinsey prediction market roundtable. At the time, he was 
the Vice President and General Manager of Best Buy‘s Geek Squad, with work involving forecasting 
models and prediction markets. 
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c. Participant Training 
Participant training can be an underappreciated element in the market 
implementation process. If an organization does not properly train participants, providing 
them with a base understanding of the prediction market concept, then the marketplace 
may struggle to maintain participants in the pool. Following the experimental prediction 
market conducted in association with this thesis, an anonymous post-market survey was 
conducted to poll participants on the implementation, operation, and outcome of the 
experiment. Multiple survey responses indicated that participants stopped trading because 
they did not understand the markets. This likely resulted from improper participant 
training. 
Although it is imperative that market managers attract uninformed traders, 
it also is essential that at least the majority of the traders understand the prediction market 
concept. Traders must realize that not everyone will be an informed trader in every 
market. In fact, most traders will not be fully informed in most markets. It is neither 
realistic nor efficient for the majority of participants to be fully informed, as the market 
would become stagnant without information asymmetry, which is necessary for trading to 
occur. However, each participant may have some general and unique information with 
respect to certain markets. Therefore, participants need to understand that in every market 
some uninformed traders must participate to ensure market efficiency, even if this means 
trading only on inclinations or market trends. It is a matter of knowing, understanding 
and embracing the various roles within the market‘s participation pool, as well as 
understanding that traders can act in various roles at various times. 
d. Understanding Trading Strategies: Short selling 
To further enhance market efficiency, the majority of traders must 
understand the ways in which they can utilize their market currency within a given 
market. More specifically, traders must understand that they have the ability to trade long 
or short. In addition, they must know how best to do either, based on given market 
conditions and their beliefs on a given event‘s likelihood of occurrence.  
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Trading long is intuitive and relatively easy for most traders to understand 
and embrace. The basic gist is to buy low and sell high, or hold for an expected positive 
payout following the market‘s close. Market inefficiencies can occur when traders do not 
understand or embrace their opportunities to sell-short. Short selling is the act of bidding 
against (or selling shares one does not own for) an event contract that a trader believes 
has an over-valued (or too high) probability of occurrence. It effectively is the reverse of 
trading long. With short selling, one effectively sells high, and later buys low—the twist 
is the seller does not own any shares at the time of the sale, but rather sells on credit with 
a promise to purchase the same number of shares at a later time. In other words, if most 
of the market participants believe an event will occur and a few traders believe that the 
event has a low probability, then the few can conduct short-sales with an expectation that 
prices ultimately will drop or move to zero at market closing. According to Brigitte 
Yuille, short selling contributes liquidity, efficiency and a voice of reason in bull markets 
(Yuille, n.d.). 
An example can help illustrate the process and its advantages. Assume a 
given market price is $ 0.80, with payoffs set at $1.00 if event y occurs and $0 if event y 
does not occur—one can infer that the market collectively assesses an 80 percent 
probability of event y occurring. First, consider the act of trading long. If trader Joe 
believes event y will occur, he may purchase one share at $ 0.80. If event y occurs, trader 
Joe is paid $1.00; he profits $ 0.20 ($1.00 payout minus his $ .80 purchase price). Now 
assume trader Joe does not believe event y will occur; he may elect to short-sell event y. 
Trader Joe would sell one share at $ .80, with a promise to buyback that one share at a 
later time. If he holds the share and market price decreases to $ .30, he may buy back the 
one share at $ 0.30. Thus, trader Joe profits $ 0.50 ($ .80 revenue from the initial sale 
minus $ 0.30 from the buyback). Moreover, if he holds the share until the market closes 
and event y does not occur, he will buy back the one share at $0. Thus, trader Joe profits 
$ 0.80 ($ .80 revenue from the initial sale minus $0 from the buyback). However, if trader 
Joe conducted his short-sale as above and event y does occur, he would lose $ 0.20 ($ .80 
revenue from initial sale minus $1.00 from the buyback).  
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Buyback can occur at any time prior to market closing; thus, the figures 
above are purely arbitrary for the sake of illustrating the concept. People often conduct 
their buyback prior to market closing either to collect profit from a decline in a contract‘s 
market price or to cut losses from a subsequent rise in a contract‘s market price. In a 
short-sale, the risk of loss is much the same as that associated with trading long, but the 
risk may be greater in terms of amount per share when one sells-short against low 
probability events. 
Risk of loss is not the only drawback to short selling. When a trader short-
sells, a portion of that trader‘s marketplace assets are placed into holding until the 
subsequent buyback occurs, and these funds in holding cannot be used for any other 
marketplace security until the buyback. The amount held in reserve is equal to the 
maximum cost of buying back every shorted share under the worst-case scenario—this is 
roughly equal to the number of shares shorted multiplied by the positive payout price. 
This means that significant portions of a trader‘s market assets may be held in reserve for 
high volume short-sales, which ties up valuable assets from other marketplace ventures.  
Traders must understand the implication of short selling, as it can greatly 
affect the way in which they choose to conduct trades with their personal knowledge 
under given market conditions. Furthermore, if traders do not understand the above 
implications, the market as a whole cannot function as efficiently as possible. New 
information may be revealed much more slowly, or not at all.  
Proper training can help establish baselines for participants with respect to 
efficient trading strategy. Good training can minimize much inefficiency before it occurs, 
and it can prevent traders from becoming frustrated by common but unintuitive 
marketplace occurrences. This in turn helps maintain a reliable participation pool. 
2. Manipulation 
Manipulation is a common concern when considering prediction market 
utilization. There are several instances of known attempts to manipulate prediction 
markets, though these attempts at market manipulation generally have failed. However, it 
is conceivable that some participants may attempt to manipulate a given market. For 
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instance, some unethical traders may explicitly and intentionally spread false information 
to drive down the price of a given contract subsequent to short selling within that market 
(Yuille, n.d.). Furthermore, traders may attempt market manipulation to personally profit 
or to influence resultant decisions linked to a prediction market. However, profit motives 
for all participants generally ensure such manipulation attempts are not successful 
(Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 2004, p. 119). Since all traders have incentives to predict 
accurately, any erroneous or manipulative trades likely will be counteracted and corrected 
by other knowledgeable and informed traders. 
In terms of manipulation for personal profit, Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2006) 
highlight several examples in which known manipulation attempts resulted in only short-
term price fluctuations, which the markets subsequently corrected within 24 hours (p. 
11). However, the examples cited by Wolfers and Zitzewitz involved relatively thick 
markets. The extent to which a given market can be manipulated depends on the market‘s 
thinness (Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 2004, p. 119). With a thin market, the ability to fend off 
manipulation attempts resides with many fewer participants, and the potential for market 
manipulation is greater. 
With respect to manipulation to influence resultant decisions, such attempts can 
involve individuals or groups. In particular, Michael Abramowicz discussed the notion of 
unrepresentative decision makers by which resultant decisions are made or influenced 
(Abramowicz, 2003, pp. 46–51). Abramowicz suggested that prediction markets that 
affect resultant decisions could have a participant pool that lacks diversity, or is 
unrepresentative of the general population that is affected by the resultant decision(s). In 
such cases, the non-diverse participant pool either may intentionally, or through an 
unintended social judgment bias11, systemically provide unrepresentative inputs into the 
prediction market leading to a particular resultant decision. Again, this is of particular 
concern with thin markets. Decision makers must be aware and consider such 
possibilities when utilizing prediction markets and establishing associated participation 
pools. 
                                                 
11 See page 29 for more on social judgment bias. 
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3. Biases 
Biases are important elements to consider when assessing prediction market 
accuracy and correlating market prices to event probabilities. Biases affect how people 
interact, perceive, and share information. This strong sense of perception related to 
critical events and conditions can lead people to conduct trades somewhat irrationally. 
Moreover, biases may cause participants to repeatedly over- or under-value specific 
contracts. The following sections briefly discuss four of the most prevalent biases of 
which decision makers should be aware: 1) over-optimism, 2) under-pricing of extremes, 
3) long shot, and 4) social judgment. 
a. Over-optimism 
The over-optimism bias is one in which employees hold an overly 
optimistic view of their organization and/or its ability to achieve certain goals. Most 
organizations generally would appreciate having a problem such as this, but this bias can 
affect prices and associated probabilities among prediction markets related to an 
organization‘s goals or performance. Bo Cowgill noticed this bias in Google‘s prediction 
markets: 
The cause seems to be new employees, whose trades show that they are 
highly optimistic about our company. The external Google stock price also 
seems to play a role. [. . .] People feel excited about the company when the 
stock performs well, so they‘re more likely to bet that good things will 
happen to Google. (Dye, 2008, p. 88) 
b. Under-pricing Extremes 
Under-pricing extremes is a common occurrence in which, generally, risk-
averse participants underestimate the likelihood of low-probability events. This may be 
especially prevalent when a market has contracts with a relatively high actual probability 
of occurrence; by default, such markets will have some contracts with relatively low 
actual probabilities of occurrence. In this case, traders may under-price the low 
probability event(s) by trading more heavily in favor of the high probability event(s). In 
effect, traders may assume away the possibility of a low-probability event actually 
occurring. For instance, Google observed this bias when utilizing prediction markets to 
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forecast the number of people who would use a given service: ―When we floated 
contracts with five different outcomes—for example, forecasts about the number of 
Gmail users—the highest and the lowest outcome happened more often than the market 
expected‖ (Dye, 2008, p. 88). 
c. Long Shot 
The long shot bias is nearly the opposite of under-pricing extremes. Many 
risk-seeking people will overestimate the probability of low-probability events occurring. 
This can also lead to price or probability distortion as high-probability events have prices 
that reflect lower-than-actual probabilities; conversely, low-probability events have 
prices that reflect higher-than-actual probabilities. The effects of long shot bias and 
under-pricing extremes might counterbalance one another in markets characterized by 
both biases, although to our knowledge no empirical evidence exists to support this. 
d. Social Judgment 
Social judgment is based loosely on social judgment theory; to our 
knowledge, it is not a supported theory or bias among economists or prediction market 
experts. Rather, social judgment is used here as a way of categorizing and labeling all 
personally and professionally held biases that are based on one‘s prior experiences, 
current circumstances, and any associated social networks (whether formal or informal in 
nature). The principle idea is that all people hold biases that are continuously formed and 
reshaped by socio-psychological experiences over the course of one‘s life. In general, 
decision makers may assume that such biases are universal, unavoidable, and have no net 
effect on a prediction market. However, we hypothesize that in some instances this bias 
could affect a given market. 
To understand the way in which social judgment may affect a given 
market, one first must understand the ways in which such biases are reinforced. People 
tend to socially network in unique and recurring ways; when people socially network 
with others who possess common social biases, the social judgments of the group may 
become reinforced or strengthened. This strengthening of judgments likely depends on 
the size of the social group involved, as well as the strength of respective individual 
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biases among the group. Depending on a given organization‘s size and makeup, as well 
as the nature and amount of information sharing, the group strengthening of judgments 
could potentially skew prediction market probabilities for a given market. In short, the 
chief concern for this bias arises when a prediction market operates with a participant 
pool that, unintentionally or not, is homogeneous. Such a group likely would share 
subjective opinions and beliefs across a number of topics.   
Interestingly, a benefit may be gained from the social judgment bias. 
Again, depending on a given organization‘s size and makeup, as well as the nature and 
amount of information sharing, this bias may serve to highlight the ways in which 
information is gathered and shared within a given organization. This may offer insight to 
an organization‘s formal and informal social and communication networks. Google 
recognized observable network communication patterns among its employees during 
prediction market trading:  
Our [Google‘s] markets showed that beliefs are clustered, and these 
clusters are made up of individuals who physically sit and work close to 
each other. . . . Clusters also form around working together, socializing 
outside of work, and speaking a common language, even when this 
doesn‘t involve sitting close by. (Dye, 2008, p. 88) 
4. Legal Restrictions 
Legal restrictions may present one of the chief limitations of prediction markets. 
In particular, anti-gambling laws are the principal barrier to real money prediction 
markets (Hanson, 2003, p. 107). Moreover, Arrow et al. (2007) claim, ―Current laws and 
regulations affecting the use of prediction markets in the United States are likely to 
stymie innovation, and thus reduce economic welfare‖ (p. 2). 
However, Arrow et al. (2007) suggest three ways an organization may reduce its 
legal risk with respect to real money prediction markets: 1) obtain a no-action letter from 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), 2) provide allotments to 
participants so they do not risk losing their own money, and 3) listing the prediction 
market on a traditional futures exchange (p. 2). Interestingly, Arrow et al. also observe 
that while the CFTC oversees several prediction markets at the federal level, only the 
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Iowa Electronic Markets operates with real money because ―its [IEM] researchers were 
able to obtain a letter from the CFTC that permitted them to do so under certain limited 
conditions‖ (p. 2). 
This chapter has highlighted the key benefits and limitations associated with 
prediction markets. The following are the key benefits of prediction markets: their 
dynamic nature, accuracy, and potential for anonymous revelations. Prediction markets 
are dynamic in nature; that is, they are capable of efficiently aggregating information in a 
continuous or ongoing manner. Additionally, prediction markets are capable of 
performing their information aggregation with a high degree of accuracy; they can 
quickly pull together information spread across many people and places, and the accuracy 
of the results can rival most any alternative forecasting method under optimal conditions. 
Moreover, prediction markets allow users to express personal opinions and beliefs on 
specific topics in an anonymous fashion; this encourages feedback at all organizational 
levels without any fear of management or peer reprisal. 
The chief limitations addressed in this chapter are those associated with 
participation, manipulation, biases, and legal restrictions. Prediction markets require 
some minimum level of participation to avoid stagnation; without enough participants in 
the active pool, active traders may lose interest and/or incentive to share their information 
with other active traders. Additionally, manipulation can become a viable concern in 
prediction markets that have little active participation. This chapter also discussed the 
following biases that can affect trading, and thus accuracy: over-optimism, under-pricing 
extremes, long shot, and social judgment. Finally, legal restrictions can limit some 
organizations‘ ability to easily or efficiently implement and manage prediction markets; 
legal restrictions generally have the greatest impact on those who seek to utilize real 
money prediction markets, as government concerns with gambling and ethics move to the 
forefront.  
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IV. WHEN TO USE PREDICTION MARKETS 
Prediction markets can supersede geographic boundaries and cultural barriers by 
quickly aggregating information, and they can do so with high quality. However, there 
can be considerable cost and effort involved in establishing these markets. According to 
Tziralis and Tatsiopoulos (2007), it is essential that organizations use prediction markets 
when the desired forecast importance is relatively high, to optimize organizational efforts 
and spending involved in implementing, and maintaining market(s) (p. 257). One of the 
most critical questions to consider is that of when to use prediction markets. Several 
factors have an important role in determining the answer to this key question, including 
time-sensitivity of the desired information, importance of information and forecasts, 
required quality, and cost or budget constraints. For simplicity, these factors can be 
grouped into two broad categories: 1) forecast objectives and 2) market feasibility. The 
following sections discuss various considerations of each category with respect to 
determining whether an organization should use a prediction market. 
A. FORECAST OBJECTIVES 
Forecasting objectives can assist in determining the forecasting importance, and 
they can aide in selecting the proper forecasting means for the organization‘s desired 
ends. Organizations should use statistical and econometric methods when there is 
sufficient historical data and information to support forecasting (Chen, 2005). Such 
methods carry cost benefits as well as familiarity and ease of utilization. However, such 
methods generally cannot match the detail, flexibility, and efficiency that prediction 
markets offer. 
Prediction markets are superior to other forecasting methods in their ability to 
aggregate dispersed information efficiently. The following excerpt from Yiling Chen‘s 
doctoral thesis (2005) supports this conclusion: 
Information markets are more suitable when information about future 
events is dispersed among an organization or society, especially when 
information only exists as tacit knowledge or those who have information 
tend to not reveal it. (p. 120) 
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Additionally, a McKinsey conference roundtable discussion (Dye, 2008) on 
prediction markets provides an example that illustrates these sentiments. Among the 
panelists was Jeff Severts of Best Buy. He offered multiple accounts in which ground 
level employee-based prediction markets bested the conventional forecasting techniques 
used by his professional forecasting experts for forecasting holiday gift card sales (Dye, 
2008). 
The nature of forecast objectives likely will not determine exclusively whether to 
use prediction markets as a primary forecasting tool. Rather, the obstacles presented 
through market use also will play an important role. In spite of their strong benefits, 
prediction markets certainly carry unique limitations. Prediction markets require a useful 
body of pertinent knowledge in addition to an assembly of users who continually 
participate with an accurate perception of their collective knowledge pool. Wolfers and 
Zitzewitz (2004) offer a strong assessment of these two requirements:   
As such, these markets are unlikely to perform well when there is little 
useful intelligence to aggregate or when public information is selective, 
inaccurate or misleading. […] For example, the public information on the 
probability of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq appears to have been of 
dubious quality, so it is perhaps unsurprising that [...] the markets were as 
susceptible as general public opinion to being misled. (pp. 121–122) 
B. MARKET FEASIBILITY  
In determining a market‘s feasibility, an organization first must fully understand 
its desired market objectives. The desired results should heavily affect the market‘s 
format through specific and clear market contracts (posed questions). Broad or unclear 
questions will attract less meaningful information inputs to the market. When 
determining the feasibility of prediction markets, organizations must consider three key 
issues:  
 Nature of available information 
 Cost 
 Political and Legal Considerations 
An organization must assess the nature of available information. To make a 
prediction market worthwhile, information must be relevant and available for 
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aggregation. Additionally, the number of questions can drastically affect a market‘s 
performance. Therefore, an organization should not use too few or too many questions to 
aggregate information from market participants. If there are too few questions, an 
organization cannot aggregate information effectively for optimal forecasting. If there are 
too many questions, market liquidity will decrease, and, in addition, the resource or time-
cost for managing the overall market will increase. Moreover, cost is generally the 
deciding factor when organizations assess desirability of taking on new investments, so 
increased costs may deter or limit organizations from using prediction markets. Finally, 
certain political or legal restrictions may present challenges or obstacles to organizations 
implementing certain prediction markets. The following sections more fully discuss each 
of the aspects in turn.  
1. Nature of Available Information 
A prediction market‘s quality is no better than the sum of the available 
information it seeks to aggregate. Furthermore, a market relies on informed and 
uninformed participants to sustain market liquidity and accuracy. Therefore, an 
organization should only use a prediction market when it expects that the dispersed 
information is relevant and of high quality. Moreover, an organization must ensure it can 
properly incentivize sufficient participants to aggregate the desired information 
effectively. ―Whether there are people with relevant information, and whether these 
people can be attracted to participate are important for better predictions‖ (Chen, 2005, p. 
123). Thus, failing to meet either condition above should dissuade an organization from 
developing a prediction market as its primary forecasting tool. 
2. Cost 
Cost is a critical issue associated with a greater number of questions. With more 
market questions, the total cost will be higher in the form of additional time and resources 
necessary for operating and maintaining the market. Moreover, significant time and 
resources are required to plan, design, and implement a prediction market. In general, the 
upfront financial burden of the prediction market may seem quite low, making it an 
attractive option for organizational forecasting; however, organizations must understand 
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that prediction markets require a great deal of time and effort for successful development 
and operation. Furthermore, much of this time burden will likely fall on existing 
personnel (such as departmental managers or higher) to ensure selecting the most 
appropriate and useful marketplace questions and to ensure contracts are clear and 
formed in such a way as to draw out all desired information.   
Clearly, cost is of significant importance since every organization must abide by 
some form of budget constraint. Effectively, there is finite money and resources available 
for organizations to invest in prediction markets. As with all sound investments, the 
benefits of the investment should outweigh the cost or risk of the investment. Therefore, 
organizations must conduct sufficient analysis and give great thought when assessing the 
feasibility of utilizing a prediction market for organizational gain. 
3. Political and Legal Considerations 
Political or legal circumstances may affect one‘s decision to use prediction 
markets. The DARPA prediction market effort to predict and prevent terrorist attacks is 
one common example used to highlight an unfavorable political condition for market 
utilization. DARPA‘s FutureMap program came under Congressional and media scrutiny 
on the following bases: 1) the markets were unethical and 2) adversaries could potentially 
manipulate markets in their favor. As a result, DARPA shut down the FutureMap 
program (Looney, 2003). 
Legal obstacles can prove equally challenging when assessing the overall 
environment for prediction market utilization. Gambling and trade regulations pose 
serious challenges to adopting prediction markets for decision-making purposes. As a 
result, organizations must thoroughly consider the market‘s trade format as well as the 
means of incentivizing participants. According to Chen (2005), ―legal issues of gambling 
make most public information markets in the United States only play money‖ (p. 121).12  
                                                 
12 This does not imply that play money markets are not as effective or accurate as real money markets. 
Indeed, a number of experiments have proven differences in accuracy can be negligible between real and 
play money markets. A subsequent section pertaining to participatory incentives develops this idea more 
fully. 
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V. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
A. DESIGN 
1. Introduction/Overview 
According to Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004), ―The success of prediction markets  
. . . depend[s] on their design and implementation‖ (p. 120). Furthermore, in designing a 
prediction market, an organization must consider numerous factors and details. The next 
five sections discuss critical aspects of market design, to include:  
 Claim Definition  
 Claim Structure 
 Trading Mechanisms 
 Participation 
 Real money, Play money and Associated Incentives 
2. Claim Definition 
Claim definition is one of the most critical and challenging aspects of prediction 
market design and development. Claim definition is the means by which a market 
designer communicates his desired purpose or claim end state to market participants. 
Practically applied, the claim definition is the question or statement posed to the 
marketplace traders. Even with an abundance of useful knowledge readily available for 
aggregation, a poorly defined claim can render a market ineffective by nullifying 
potential market benefits and usefulness. Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004) succinctly state, 
―[f]or a prediction market to work well, contracts must be clear, easily understood and 
easily adjudicated‖ (p. 120).  
To be effective and legitimate, prediction markets must account for all possible 
event outcomes. In practice, this means that if one is interested in assessing the 
probability of a given football team beating another, market designers must also account 
for the possibility of a tie. This allows traders to fully interact with one another without 
doubt or uncertainty in the contract‘s designed end state. Accordingly, contracts must 
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have a clear and definite end state that bears no element of doubt or uncertainty, and they 
should have an associated pre-determined timeframe for which they are active. For 
example, the following claim ―The Cubs will win a championship‖ does not provide a 
clear and definite end state because it does not specify whether it refers to the World 
Series (the major league baseball championship), the National League Championship, or 
something else altogether; each are viable options that any given individual could 
perceive as satisfying the claim. Therefore, the claim in question is unclear and open to 
interpretation. Additionally, the claim ―The Cubs will win the World Series‖ does not 
provide a pre-determined timeframe for which the claim is active. A more appropriate 
claim is ―The Cubs will win the World Series before 2012.‖ This claim is clearly defined, 
and has a definite end state and a predetermined timeframe. Though challenging, 
organizations using prediction markets must clearly define all claims for the market to 
remain effective, efficient, and manageable. 
3. Claim Structure 
Participants make claims about the future through the prediction market 
securities. These claims have associated prices and are traded in the prediction market in 
much the same way as stocks are traded in public stock markets. The claim structure is 
the means of assigning the associated payoff to market traders. It depends on the 
security‘s objective as determined by the claim definition. The most common claim 
structures are winner-take-all, index, and spread. The following paragraphs describe each 
of these three structures. 
a. Winner-take-all 
A winner-take-all structure determines the likelihood or probability of a 
single event‘s occurrence. A political election is a commonly cited example. Winner-
take-all should be the claim structure for determining the probability that a party or 
candidate will win. As described by Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004), ―The price on a 
winner-take-all market represents the market‘s expectation of the probability that an 
event will occur (assuming risk neutrality)‖ (p. 109). 
  39 
b. Index 
An index claim is useful in determining the expected value of a continuous 
random variable (Chen, 2005, p. 9). The payoff for an index claim is variable and 
depends on the event‘s outcome (e.g., a payment equal to the percentage of the popular 
vote received by a political party or candidate). Consistent with the above election 
example, an index claim has the ability to forecast the percentage of votes for a given 
party or candidate during a given election. Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004) define an 
index‘s market price as ―the mean value that the market assigns to the outcome‖ (p. 109). 
c. Spread 
The spread claim forecasts the probability of a future event‘s occurrence 
by adjusting the margin from a fixed suggested probability for a given claim‘s 
occurrence. To remain consistent with the example above, a spread claim is useful in 
determining whether a particular political party or candidate is likely to receive more (or 
less) than a given percentage of votes during a given election. Deferring to Wolfers and 
Zitzewitz (2004) helps provide a clearer description of this claim, in addition to the 
meaning of its results: 
In spread betting, the price of the bet is fixed, but the size of the spread 
can adjust. When spread betting is combined with an even-money bet (that 
is, winners double their money while losers receive zero), the outcome can 
yield the market‘s expectation of the median outcome, because this is only 
a fair bet if a payoff is as likely to occur as not. (p. 109) 
Although the three security claim types discussed are mutually exclusive, 
market managers may elect to use more than one of the claim types to evaluate 
information associated with a given market. For the example used throughout this 
discussion, each claim type offers a different perspective of the aggregated information 
(essentially, with respect to the same event). This can be quite useful for assessing and 
analyzing market results for organizations to make better-informed decisions. 
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4. Trading Mechanisms 
Appropriate mechanism design is essential when developing a successful market. 
In short, the market trading mechanism is what determines market conduct among all 
participants; it is that which connects buyers and sellers for market trading. Interestingly, 
many trading mechanisms, such as those utilizing an automated market maker, can 
function without requiring multiple traders to directly interact with one another. Instead, 
such mechanisms utilize a computerized programming device or mathematical algorithm 
that acts as a universal buyer/seller for any given transaction. The advantage of the 
automated market maker is that a trader can buy or sell at any time, regardless of whether 
other traders want to buy or sell. 
By far, the most common trading mechanisms are the continuous double auction 
(CDA) and market scoring rules (MSR). In addition, the dynamic pari-mutuel system 
(DPM) holds credence with many experts. Each of these mechanisms is a viable 
candidate for market implementation; however, organizations must understand the 
benefits and limitations of each to select the most suitable mechanism for a given market. 
Descriptions of each mechanism follow. 
a. CDA 
CDA is a widespread prediction market trading mechanism. It functions 
much like common financial stock exchanges, in which buyers make offers or bids on a 
security via buy orders, and sellers post an asking price via sell orders. When the buyer 
and seller prices meet, there is agreement for the sale or trade of a given security. The key 
benefit to CDA is its familiarity for market managers and participants. Additionally, 
CDA is appropriate when organizations aspire to forecast a specific point within a broad 
range of numbers. However, the critical drawback of CDA is its inability to maintain 
liquidity in thin markets.   
Some CDA markets use a market maker (CDAwMM) to help maintain 
liquidity, but they possess a unique and severe drawback in the form of added risk for the 
auctioneer or market owner (Chen, 2005, p. 127). As Chen points out, ―The auctioneer 
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may lose considerable amounts of money depends [sic] on what happens in the future. 
The cost of the auctioneer is not bounded‖ (p. 127). 
Though slightly more complex than traditional CDA‘s, NewsFutures is 
perhaps the most well known example of a CDA marketplace. NewsFutures utilizes an 
automated market maker to improve liquidity within its markets, but traders buy and sell 
shares directly from one another through an automatic trade-offer queuing process.  
b. MSR 
To overcome liquidity shortcomings associated with traditional CDAs, 
Robin Hanson proposed a scoring rules mechanism, commonly referred to as market 
scoring rules (p. 107). Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004) explain that Hanson suggests using a 
set of scoring rules to allow market participants to trade on ―simultaneous predictions 
over many combinations of outcomes‖ (p. 120). This allows for combining market events 
for a more realistic forecasting assessment rather than simplistically isolating individual 
events. According to Wolfers and Zitzewitz, ―instead of requiring separate markets for 
each combination of possible outcomes, traders effectively bet that the sum of their errors 
over all predictions will be lower‖ (p. 120). Hanson‘s MSR effectively acts as an 
automated market maker that rewards participants for improving the overall quality of 
market forecasts in a stepwise manner. Chen (2005) provides the following description of 
Hanson‘s MSR: 
MSR maintains a probability distribution across all events. Anyone who 
believes that the probability distribution is wrong can change it at any 
time. The person then receives a payment [. . .] according to a scoring rule, 
and in return, agrees to pay the next person who changes the distribution. 
(p. 127) 
MSR is useful in forecasting a broader or more complex set of outcomes. 
Additionally, MSR guarantees liquidity since no buyer-seller pricing matching is required 
for trading to occur. However, because of its design, MSR is not appropriate when 
forecasting figures within a continuous range of numbers.13 Although there is some risk 
                                                 
13 This often is overcome, to some extent, by offering multiple contract options, each associated with a 
given smaller range within the entire range of consideration. Collectively, the smaller ranges are 
continuous, and they encompass the entire desired range of consideration.  
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or cost required for subsidizing the initial market bet(s), MSR limits the market 
manager‘s maximum cost to the initial subsidy. Participants assume all other trading risk 
by paying (receiving) funds to (from) one another via the market maker and according to 
the market‘s scoring rules.  
Inkling‘s public marketplace is a good example of MSR. The MSR acts as 
an automated market maker by which users can conduct trades via the simple web-
interface. Participants can always buy or sell shares within a given market, assuming they 
have sufficient wealth in their portfolios. The Inkling platform is discussed further in 
Chapter VI of this thesis.14  
c. DPM 
Seeking to overcome potential liquidity limitations associated with 
traditional market mechanisms, David Pennock proposed the dynamic pari-mutuel 
system, and its associated differential equations. In effect, DPM acts as an automated 
market maker since DPM operates based on a price function that reflects a continuously 
updated probability for a given event‘s occurrence. Share prices update dynamically 
according to the price function, which can be fixed in one of two primary ways: money-
ratio or share-ratio. The money-ratio price function ―defines the ratio of any two stock 
prices in the same market as always equal to the ratio of money invested in the stocks‖ 
(Chen, Pennock, & Kasturi, 2008, p. 4). With the share-ratio, the price function sets the 
share prices ―to equate the ratio of prices of any two securities by the ratio of number of 
shares outstanding for the two securities at any time of the market‖ (Chen, Pennock, & 
Kasturi, 2008, p. 2). Because of the ways in which the price functions work, market 
probabilities are not explicitly inferable from given market prices. Rather, other 
differential equations translate market prices into given event probabilities, if so desired.  
 
 
                                                 
14 The practical experiment associated with this thesis relied upon Inkling‘s platform. 
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Whether real or play, money from the sale of market securities moves to a 
collective market pot. For market payout, the market manager deducts any maintenance 
and transaction fees from the pot and then disperses funds to all market winners, with 
market losers receiving nothing. Chen (2005) offers a good description of the DPM 
payout process: 
After the true outcome is revealed, all the money that is lost by those who 
bet on the incorrect outcome is redistributed to those who bet on the 
correct outcome. […] Unlike a pari-mutual market, where each dollar 
always buys an equal share of the payoff, each dollar that people wager in 
a DPM buys a variable share of the payoff depending on the state of the 
market. (pp. 127–128) 
Familiarity and simplicity are benefits of the DPM mechanism. In 
addition, unlike traditional pari-mutuel systems that incentivize late trading, DPM 
incentivizes participants to reveal good information early. This occurs because the 
amount invested in the market can only increase over time, which means that market 
probability predictions are more sensitive to a given investment earlier than later. 
Additionally, the DPM mechanism has infinite liquidity, as there is no requirement for 
buyer/seller order matching (Chen, 2005, p. 127). Furthermore, DPM generally is 
desirable when organizations seek to forecast a specific point within a broad range of 
numbers. Finally, similar to MSR there is no manager risk or cost beyond the required 
subsidy for the initial trade(s). 
It is unclear whether any current public marketplaces exclusively utilize 
DPM. However, the Yahoo!-O‘Reilly Tech Buzz Game is one of the most notable DPM 
applications. The Tech Buzz Game operated from 2005 to 2008 with dual purposes: ―One 
[was] to evaluate the power of prediction markets to forecast high-tech trends. [. . .] The 
other [. . .] [was] to field test the dynamic pari-mutuel market‖ (Mangold, et al., 2005, p. 
94). Traders conducted on-demand transactions by buying and selling shares from one 
another and/or from a market maker—the marketplace interface smoothly masked the 
market mechanism‘s mechanics. Traders simply placed orders and watched transactions 
occur instantly, without knowledge of whether a given trade occurred with another trader 
or with the market maker.  
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Selecting an appropriate market mechanism is central to the design 
process. Organizations must fully understand their own objectives, intended scope, and 
other likely market limitations when selecting the market mechanism for a given 
marketplace. Additionally, there is no such thing as a ―one-size-fits-all‖ design 
appropriate for all organizations. For a given organization, determining which trading 
mechanism is most appropriate depends on two primary considerations: 
 How large is the potential participant pool? 
 What type of information is the organization attempting to forecast?  
If the potential participant pool is small, the resultant design implication is 
that an automated market maker is necessary to promote liquidity and avoid high person-
to-person bid/ask spreads. Additionally, the organization‘s selection of market 
mechanism should depend on the type of information the organization seeks to forecast. 
If an organization is forecasting mutually exclusive or discrete outcomes, MSR is an 
appropriate mechanism. However, MSR does not allow organizations to forecast 
continuous organizational metrics. Rather, the CDA or DPM mechanisms are more 
appropriate when organizations want to pinpoint a continuous number.  
Borrowed from Chen (2005), Table 2 summarizes the above mechanisms 
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Table 2.   Comparison of Trading Mechanisms (From Chen, 2005, p. 129) 
Trading Mechanism Liquidity Market Manager Risk/Cost 
CDA Illiquidity when market is thin No risk, only matching orders. 
CDAwMM Guaranteed liquidity 
Market owner has risk, can incur 
unbounded cost. 
MSR Guaranteed liquidity 
Market owner has limited risk, can 
incur bounded cost. 
DPM Guaranteed liquidity 
Market owner needs a predetermined 
cost to start the market. No risk after 
the market is started. 
5. Participation 
In determining which individuals should participate in a given prediction market, 
organizations should look beyond an expert-only participant pool, and elicit participation 
from any organizational member with access to pertinent market information. Intuitively, 
wider participation pools generally provide a greater knowledge base than do narrow 
participation pools. Moreover, prediction markets can thrive only when liquidity exists 
from a diverse pool of active participants. Put simply, markets need uninformed 
participants—those participants whose topical knowledge base provides no further 
insight into a given market security‘s potential outcome—in addition to informed 
participants to ensure market liquidity and ongoing activity. This diversity creates 
potential for profit and, thus, creates incentive for all participants to engage actively. In 
seeking only experts to participate, organizations may miss this necessary diversity if 
expert opinion is relatively uniform, and participants face the motivation challenges 
discussed shortly. 
Eliciting participation is another crucial element when operating a prediction 
market. Often, the primary motivation factors driving market participation are 
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entertainment and personal confidence or pride in one‘s expertise. People generally 
choose to participate in markets and auctions when there are prizes or when the market is 
attractive and entertaining. Common examples are sports and movie wagering markets, 
which are only a step away from gambling in terms of individual motivation for 
participation. Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004) appear to support this notion based on the 
following quote, ―the ‗play money‘ exchanges and sports gambling industry both suggest 
that it may be possible to motivate [. . .] trading simply through the thrill of pitting one‘s 
judgment against others, and being able to win a monetary prize may sharpen this 
motivation‖ (p. 121). 
Personal pride or confidence in one‘s expertise can also lead individuals to 
participate in prediction markets based on a presumed superiority in obtaining or 
processing available knowledge. If all participants believed they were no better than 
anyone else at obtaining or processing available information, then there is no motivation 
to conduct trades or seek new information. Moreover, the nature of available information 
plays a significant role among participants in perceiving their own relative understanding 
of that information. For instance, people are hesitant to conduct trades when they believe 
there is a subgroup of participants possessing insider information. Skepticism can affect 
the group as a whole, preventing would-be participants from conducting trades. In this 
environment, the market can break down and become completely ineffective. The 
following passage from Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004) underscores the importance of 
these revelations: 
These insights suggest that some prediction markets will work better when 
they concern events that are widely discussed, since trading on such events 
will have higher entertainment value and there will be more information 
on whose interpretation traders can disagree. Ambiguous public 
information may be better in motivating trade than private information, 
especially if the private information is concentrated, since a cadre of 
highly informed traders can easily drive out the partly informed, 
repressing trade to the point that the market barely exists. (p. 121) 
6. Real Money, Play Money and Associated Incentives 
As discussed in the previous section, participation is vital for a prediction 
market‘s success. However, various motivating forces drive participants to engage 
  47 
actively in a given market. According to Schrieber (2004), ―Although many informed 
individuals are motivated to trade simply out of an intrinsic enjoyment [. . .] remuneration 
may be required to extract timely and accurate information from others‖ (p. 37). When 
considering participation, one likely thinks of potential participatory incentives. Such 
incentives can be useful for enticing participants who otherwise would not engage in the 
prediction market. To this point, successful markets have utilized cash and non-cash 
incentives to elicit participation. Moreover, these incentives are generally linked to a 
market‘s assets. Market assets are defined by two specific market structures: real money 
and play money. The following paragraphs provide real and play money market 
descriptions, along with discussions on cash and non-cash incentives. 
Cash incentives are most commonly associated with real money markets. Real 
money markets require participants to use their own money, though perhaps subsidized 
by the organization, to conduct trades. This structure may provide strong incentives for 
some individuals, as it can appeal to their sense of competition and desire for profit. 
Additionally, this strong incentive for participants to perform well also implies the 
market itself fares better with frequent and improved forecasting performances. The 
previous section regarding legal and political constraints has already developed the major 
challenge this reward structure presents. Real money markets are not acceptable for all 
markets, environments, or organizations because of their similarity to gambling, concerns 
over market manipulation, and ethical concerns over requiring employees to provide 
personal capital for organizational benefit.  
Play money markets are among the most prevalent for public and professional 
use. These markets usually provide some initial allotment of play money (Chen, 2005, p. 
130), which participants are free to use within the market as they see fit. As discussed by 
Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004), an added benefit of play money markets is the flexibility 
they offer: ―Play money contracts [. . .] offer more freedom to experiment with different 
kinds of contracts‖ without participants bearing a monetary risk or penalty (p. 121). 
Generally, play money markets use other incentives, such as prizes or points, to elicit 
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participation. Chen (2005) cites one good example, ―participants of Newsfutures‘ 
prediction markets can use the play money they earned to buy some items in an online 
auction shop‖ (p. 130). 
Although non-cash incentives can be associated with real money markets, they 
predominate in play money markets as the primary motivating force(s). The most 
common non-cash incentives are prizes or points—for use as currency in a marketplace 
store—that reward the historically most accurate traders or most active traders for their 
participation. Additionally, intrinsic motivating incentives that drive marketplace traders 
to continue participating over time include personal pride, natural competition, and a 
means of anonymously voicing opinions. These motivators generally factor into most 
markets, regardless of whether they are real or play money. 
When establishing a real or play money market, initial endowments may be useful 
because they provide similar feel and motivation to those of real money markets, but the 
organization absolves risk from individual participants and removes ethical concerns over 
participants using their personal money for organizational benefit. Generally, this 
structure allows participants to profit, in some form, from amounts raised beyond the 
initial endowment. Although this particular reward structure may address some ethical 
concerns, Chen (2005) warns that others still exist: ―For public information markets, legal 
and political concerns often prevent markets from using real money‖ (p. 130).  
In evaluating the reward structures above, prediction market experts have posed a 
common question regarding accuracy: Are play money markets as accurate as real money 
markets? Although insufficient empirical evidence exists for irrefutable confirmation, 
various studies do support the claim that play money markets are nearly equally as 
accurate as real money markets because play money ―wealth‖ can only be accumulated 
through a history of accurate predictions (Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 2004, p. 121). In support 
of this claim, Wolfers and Zitzewitz offer the following: 
In a suggestive experiment, Servan-Schreiber, Wolfers, Pennock and 
Galebach compared the predictive power of the prices from real money 
and play money exchanges over the 2003 NFL football season, finding 
that both yielded predictions that were approximately equally accurate. (p. 
121) 
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Clearly, several options exist for market designers to elicit participant 
involvement. The choice of which structure to use will not always be clear. Additionally, 
external forces or pressures may drive this choice, such as legal or political issues. In any 
event, the choice may prove to be one of preference rather than essence. Tziralis and 
Tatsiopoulos (2007) state, ―The decision of whether to use monetary . . . or non-monetary 
rewards . . . is up to designer and remains more an art than a science‖ (p. 256). 
7. Review 
The previous sections covered several aspects of prediction market design, 
including: 1) claim definition; 2) claim structure; 3) trading mechanisms; 4) participation; 
and 5) real money, play money and associated incentives. Table 3 provides a summary of 
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Table 3.   Summary of Prediction Market Design Aspects and Considerations 
Design Aspect Considerations 
Claim Definition 























Ability to voice opinions anonymously 
B. IMPLEMENTATION 
To introduce market implementation, Chen (2005) offers the following, ―Market 
implementation is the construction of the new [prediction] market and the delivery of the 
market into operation‖ (p. 134). In planning to implement a prediction market, an 
organization should consider three primary phases of implementation: 1) preparation, 2) 
conduct, and 3) support. The three phases of implementation offer a useful structure for 
assessing potential prediction market limitations, challenges and risks. Organizations 
should assess each phase of the implementation process. The following subsections 
highlight issues of concern for each respective phase. 
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1. Preparation 
The preparation phase encompasses several aspects of prediction market 
implementation, from feasibility assessment, to budgetary considerations, to establishing 
a pilot market. Preparing to implement a prediction market is a challenging and 
meticulous process. Appropriate support systems, such as networks and software 
packages, must be in place. An organization must determine its target audience, what 
market framework to use, and what types of questions will best meet market objectives. 
Additionally, an organization must have a good sense of the type(s) of incentives that are 
best suited for the target audience to meet market objectives. Cost assessments should 
provide useful information for determining how to fund the market, as well as for 
determining market scope limitations. Finally, before introducing a market to the target 
audience, organizations should conduct at least one pilot market to assess adequacy and 
monitor for undesirable market issues or attributes. This action will help prevent 
participants from forming an unfavorable perception of prediction markets because of 
poor market design or improper market implementation. 
2. Conduct 
 One potential pitfall when opening a market is setting initial contract 
prices. Contract prices should be set at a reasonable level to ensure there is not an 
overwhelming arbitrage opportunity when the market opens. Moreover, prices generally 
are a direct indicator of the marketplace‘s assessed probability of a given event‘s 
occurrence. Therefore, improper initial pricing can give early traders an unfair advantage 
to trade on a contract that is widely believed to be under or overpriced. Furthermore, 
initial prices can affect traders perceptions of a given event‘s expected probability. Thus, 
poorly set initial prices can adversely affect the overall market‘s initial assessment of a 
given event‘s probability of occurrence. In theory, an efficient market will eventually 
overcome such problems. 
Next, when conducting a market, an organization must continually monitor 
participation rates to assess the effectiveness of incentives. As previously discussed, 
incentives can significantly affect overall participation. Another factor that can affect 
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participation is selecting relevant and clear questions. If questions are unclear or 
irrelevant, participants are generally less inclined to trade.   
An additional issue is that organizations must find the right balance of questions 
that will adequately aggregate information without thinning out the markets. Due to 
various participatory constraints, such as limited available trading time or personal 
interest in the marketplace, participants may conduct some fixed number of total trades 
within the overall marketplace. As the number of questions increases, the average 
participation rate per question decreases. This leads to adverse market conditions with 
improper equilibrium prices due to the market‘s thinning. Therefore, the market may not 
efficiently aggregate all available information. 
A final element to consider for market conduct is timing. The timing of when and 
how frequently questions are released may affect participation rates, in part reflecting 
geographic divides among participants. Furthermore, poor or untimely questions can 
present arbitrage opportunities for those individuals who are first to trade on a given 
contract. 
3. Support 
As with any process or service, organizations must provide ongoing support to 
ensure the market operates as designed and desired. The support phase entails all details 
and considerations to ensure participants remain involved and that the market operates 
optimally to aggregate useful information. Chen (2005) highlights potential problems and 
issues arising in this stage, to include ―dispute[s] over market trading rules and traded 
contracts, database or network problems, and system security issues‖ (pp. 134–135). 
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VI. PRACTICAL EXPERIMENT 
A. EXPERIMENT DESCRIPTION 
The experiment involved running a pilot market to begin examining whether the 
Navy should consider applying prediction markets to manpower outcomes, such as 
recruiting, retention, and re-enlistment bonuses. The experiment was more hastily 
designed than we would have preferred. We faced a time constraint in designing and 
conducting a pilot market to meet our Navy sponsor‘s desires and our graduation 
timeline. Thus, our goals were to perform due diligence given our time constraints and to 
document our lessons learned.  
The N1 directorate identified 53 potential participants for the pilot, spread across 
both operational N1 personnel and the research organizations supporting N1. Because 
many of the N1 members perform similar and interrelated work, our hope was that a 
natural competitive spirit would create a cycle of market activity, engagement, and 
participation. The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) added another five participants 
consisting of two students and three thesis advisors. Each participant received an initial 
endowment of $5,000 in play money. Table 4 shows the distribution of potential 
participants by their location, office code, and functional responsibilities.  
Table 4.   Potential Participant Distribution by Location and Office Code 
Location Office Code Office Functional Responsibility Quantity
Washington, DC N104 Modeling and Analysis Branch 18
Washington, DC N1Z Strategic Affairs Office 3
Washington, DC N13 Manpower, Personnel, Training and Education Division 2
Washington, DC N130 Military Pay and Compensation Policy Branch 2
Washington, DC N133 Nuclear Propulsion Program Policy Branch 1
Washington, DC OCNR Research 1
Washington, DC CNA Contractor 7
Washington, DC LMI Contractor 2
Washington, DC SAG Contractor 2
Washington, DC Lewin Contractor 1
Washington, DC SERCO Contractor 1
Millington, TN NPRST Quick Polls 7
Millington, TN PMO Management 2
Millington, TN BUPERS 3 Community Manager/Career Development 4
Monterey, CA NPS Research 5
58Total  
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As described in Chapter V, user anonymity may be important in markets 
containing potentially controversial questions or in markets whose members are from 
varying hierarchical levels. Participants initially received a generic username consisting 
of their first initial followed by their last name. Upon creating their accounts, participants 
had the option to keep their generic username or modify it for fun or anonymity. 
One unfortunate circumstance of beginning the pilot market quickly is that it left 
little time to discuss incentives. NPS suggested our N1 sponsors incentivize participation 
with non-monetary rewards to the top-gainer, such as a preferred parking space or lunch 
with a VIP. However, N1 chose not to offer non-monetary incentives. 
B. DESIGN 
The limited number of participants was the primary factor in deciding to adopt a 
platform using an automated market maker. This choice allows participants to trade 
without using the bid/ask process required in the CDA mechanism. Thus, it promotes 
market liquidity. The choice to use an automated market maker drove the subsequent 
choices of securities types and their associated payoffs. The CEO of Inkling Markets, 
Adam Siegel, generously provided his time to answer questions, and he offered the 
Inkling Market platform, pro bono, for the pilot prediction market. The Inkling Market 
platform uses Robin Hanson‘s (2003) market scoring rules as the basis for their 
automated market maker. 
As Berg and Proebsting (2009) point out, Hanson‘s market scoring rules operate 
under the assumption that a security has mutually exclusive outcomes. Thus, the 
automated market maker is useful for determining binary (yes/no), interval, or discrete 
option outcomes. However, the algorithm cannot predict the market equilibrium of a 
continuous number, which is one function Navy N1 would like to have in their prediction 
markets. We were able to circumvent this limitation, to some extent, by allowing traders 
to choose between relatively narrow numerical intervals.  
Hanson‘s market scoring rules calls for subjectively choosing what value to 
assign an elasticity constant, ―b‖. Berg and Proebsting (2009) describe the issue in this 
way: 
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The elasticity constant b controls how much prices change for a given 
transaction size (measured in shares or cost). Setting b is a vexing 
problem: set too low, the market prices will swing wildly on any trade, 
and set too high, the market may not move enough [to] reasonably reflect 
aggregate opinions. (p. 51) 
Inkling Markets chooses to set b to .10 per share traded, which means that, the 
price adjusts up or down by ten cents per share purchased or sold, respectively. Adam 
Siegel admitted this was an arbitrary number, but he indicated that it has worked for their 
markets.  
The security payoffs were designed as winner-take-all. Thus, the shares 
representing the correct outcome were worth $100 while the shares representing incorrect 
outcome(s) were worth $0. The selection of winner-take-all payoffs was required for 
Inkling‘s automated market maker using Hanson‘s market scoring rules, where a market 
involves a set of mutually exclusive outcomes. Because the algorithm assumes only 
mutually exclusive outcomes are possible, it precludes using an index or spread payoff.  
C. MARKET MANAGEMENT 
We tailored and sent out an Inkling Inc. memo to demonstrate executive 
sponsorship to participants. Additionally, we tailored an Inkling Inc. introductory 
PowerPoint slide show to serve as an introduction to prediction markets and the Inkling 
Markets platform. We emphasized the explanation of short-sales in this tutorial to ensure 
participants were aware of what they are and how to execute them.  
1. Claim Selection 
The overall intent was to ask questions to assess what was actually taking place 
with respect to Navy active duty entry and retention. Generally, the United States 
economy was in relatively poor condition; higher than normal unemployment rates were 
coupled with declining stock market prices and housing values. These non-normal 
conditions made it difficult for the Navy to forecast retention rates using historical data 
because the economic conditions were much different from the past.  
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Taken together, this seemed to be an ideal time to explore the capability for 
prediction markets to forecast retention. However, it proved difficult for Navy N1 to 
identify four appropriate securities for the pilot. The N1 pilot faced two inherently 
difficult issues. The first was timing. The pilot was scheduled to last just under two 
months and conclude at the end of the federal government fiscal year on September 30, 
2009. This did not seem to be problematic at the outset, yet it turned out to be so. N1 
leadership had already implemented policy changes to achieve end of fiscal year goals. 
For example, N1 initially wanted to determine Nuke Zone A retention rates. Upon further 
investigation, the Navy had just suspended re-enlistment bonuses for the remainder of the 
fiscal year due to high retention rates and budget constraints. Therefore, the Nuke Zone A 
retention rate security was uninteresting: rational candidates would wait until the 
following fiscal year to re-enlist when they would be eligible to receive a substantial 
bonus for re-enlisting, thus any change in the retention rate from the current level would 
only reflect those leaving the Navy. The N1 and NPS consensus was to discard this 
candidate question.  
The other issue was bureaucratic in nature. One candidate question involved the 
number of people waiting to join the Navy via the Delayed Entry Program (DEP). While 
attempting to determine the inputs to this calculation, we learned there were at least two 
different DEP calculations to meet differing organizational purposes. As a result, there 
would be confusion over the security‘s definition.  
Ultimately, the N1 pilot involved two direct measures for Navy entry and 
retention. These were markets regarding Navy endstrength and the following year‘s 
enlisted accession goal. The pilot also consisted of two indirect economic measures that 
may affect sailors‘ decision to stay in or leave the Navy. The two indirect measures were 
for the national unemployment rate and the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA). We 
also employed short-term markets, involving primarily sports and entertainment 
questions, in hopes of keeping participants interested and active in the marketplace. Table 
5 shows the questions asked, dates the markets began and ended, contract type, contract 
choices and initial market prices. 
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Table 5.   N1 Prediction Market Pilot Questions 
Question Date Began Date Ended Contract Type Contracts Initial Market Price





Greater than 330,800 16.67%
Less than 9.0% 16.67%
9.1 - 9.3% 16.67%
9.4 - 9.6% 16.67%
9.7 - 10.0% 16.67%
10.1 - 10.5% 16.67%















Flight Of The Conchords 14.29%















What will be the Navy's endstrength 
(for officers and enlisted personnel) 
for FY2009?  (See details in Market 
Information)
Multiple-choiceAug. 10, 2009 Sep. 30, 2009
Aug. 10, 2009 Sep. 30, 2009
What will be the official Sept. 2009 
national seasonally-adjusted 
unemployment rate (per US DoL)?  
(9.4% in July; 9.7% in August)
On September 30, 2009, what will the 
Navy's FY10 enlisted accession goal 
be?
Aug. 17, 2009 Sep. 30, 2009 Multiple-choice
Will the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
(INDU) close above 9,400 by COB on 
Friday, Aug. 14, 2009?  (Closed at 9,370 
on Aug. 7, 2009)
Aug. 10, 2009 Aug. 14, 2009 Binary
Which series will receive the 
"Outstanding Comedy Series" award at 
the 61st Primetime Emmys?  (See 
details in Market Information)
Aug. 17, 2009 Sep. 20, 2009 Multiple-choice
Which series will receive the 
"Outstanding Drama Series" award at 
the 61st Primetime Emmys?  (See 
details in Market Information)
Aug. 17, 2009 Sep. 20, 2009 Multiple-choice
Who will win the 2009 NFL opening 
game between the Pittsburgh Steelers 
and Tennessee Titans?  (See details in 
Sep. 1, 2009 Sep. 10, 2009 Multiple-choice
Will the FY 2010 Defense 
Appropriation bill be signed into law 
before October 1st, 2009?
Sep. 8, 2009 Sep. 30, 2009 Binary
How many Major League Baseball 
teams will clinch a playoff spot before 
October 1st, 2009? (See details in 
Market Information)
Sep. 8, 2009 Sep. 30, 2009 Multiple-choice
 
2. Setting Initial Market Prices 
The initial market prices for each security, with one exception, were set at 1/N, 
where N is the number of possible outcomes on which traders may bid. The initial market 
price for predicting the winner in the 2009 National Football League (NFL) opening 
game between Pittsburgh Steelers and the Tennessee Titans was set at $59.90 for 
Pittsburgh to win, $40.00 for Tennessee to win and $0.10 for a tie. This allowed for the 
possibility of a tie, though a tie is extremely unlikely. We considered setting the initial 
prices for predicting both the Navy endstrength and unemployment rate to reflect a bell-
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shaped distribution to account for central tendency. However, the Inkling software 
automatically re-sorts the contracts in an ascending order according to price, which could 
confuse the initial securities listing. Thus, we decided to set the contract initial prices 
equally, using 1/N, with the NFL football game as the only exception. This initial pricing 
policy provided an incentive for traders to make relatively easy gains by participating 
early to make trades on seemingly over-/under-priced contracts. 
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VII. ASSESSMENT 
A. TRADER PARTICIPATION 
Overall, 32 of 58 potential traders registered for their N1 Prediction Market Pilot 
account. Of those 32, eight participants did not make any trades, resulting in 24 actual 
traders. Please refer to Table 6 for the breakdown of actual and potential pilot 
participants.  
Table 6.   N1 Prediction Market Pilot Participants 
 
Actual Non-users Potential 
Number of NPS participants 5 
 
5 
Number of N104 participants 8 
 
18 
Number of Non-NPS and Non-N104 participants 11 
 
35 
Number of Potential Participants that did not 




Number of Potential Participants that created 




Total 24 34 58 
 
Initially, there appeared to be high organizational interest in the prediction market 
pilot. However, the total number of traders and trades conducted declined as the 
prediction market progressed. Figure 1 provides a graphical view of the pilot by question 
and depicts the respective number of traders and trades.  
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Figure 1.   Quantity of Traders and Trades by Question  
B. QUANTITY OF TRADES 
The number of trades also declined rapidly after the first two weeks, as shown in 
Figure 2. Of all the trades conducted in the 52-day pilot, 56.9% were conducted in the 
first two weeks. The decrease in trading could reflect traders believing the markets were 
appropriately priced and had reached market equilibrium. This, however, does not seem 
to be the case because there were many opportunities for a seemingly easy gain as new 
securities were introduced using the 1/N initial pricing. Thus, some securities simply 
were not appropriately priced from the outset and traders did not take advantage of these 
opportunities. Therefore, we conclude the novelty had worn off for the traders, and their 
participation waned. 
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Figure 2.   Quantity of Trades by Week and Office Code15 
Table 7 depicts the quantity of trades per question by organization. The first four 
questions in the pilot were germane to the N1 organization. The remaining questions, 
shaded in gray, were added for ―fun‖ and were intended to spur interest and enhance 
participation. Surprisingly, 78% of the trades were conducted on the N1 relevant 








                                                 
15 Week 8 consisted of only 3 days since the market concluded at the end of the Fiscal Year. 
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Table 7.   Quantity of Trades per Question by Organization 
Question N104 NPS Other Grand Total
What will be the Navy's endstrength (for officers 
and enlisted personnel) for FY2009?  (See details 
in Market Information)
37 21 12 70
What will be the official Sept. 2009 national 
seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate (per US 
DoL)?  (9.4% in July; 9.7% in August)
33 14 14 61
Will the Dow Jones Industrial Average (INDU) 
close above 9,400 by COB on Friday, Aug. 14, 
2009?  (Closed at 9,370 on Aug. 7, 2009)
16 21 1 38
On September 30, 2009, what will the Navy's FY10 
enlisted accession goal be?
9 8 7 24
Which series will receive the "Outstanding Drama 
Series" award at the 61st Primetime Emmys?  
(See details in Market Information)
2 5 5 12
Which series will receive the "Outstanding 
Comedy Series" award at the 61st Primetime 
Emmys?  (See details in Market Information)
3 6 4 13
Who will win the 2009 NFL opening game 
between the Pittsburgh Steelers and Tennessee 
Titans?  (See details in Market Information)
1 2 2 5
How many Major League Baseball teams will 
clinch a playoff spot before October 1st, 2009? 
(See details in Market Information)
1 11 2 14
Will the FY 2010 Defense Appropriation bill be 
signed into law before October 1st, 2009?
2 3 4 9
Grand Total 104 91 51 246  
C. PILOT PREDICTION MARKET ASSESSMENT 
The reduction in trading volume may reflect the topics or the timing of their 
introduction. We predicted the first two ―fun‖ questions, regarding the Primetime 
Emmy‘s for Drama and Comedy series, would have wide appeal and elicit participation. 
That proved not to be the case. These questions were introduced at the same time as the 
Navy‘s FY10 enlisted accession goal question. The number of trades on the Navy‘s 
enlisted accession goal was nearly equal to the number of trades on the two Emmy 
questions.  
We thought introducing a question about the 2009 NFL opening game between 
the Tennessee Titans and Pittsburgh Steelers would be an engaging question, considering 
the general enthusiasm for the beginning of the NFL season and the teams involved. 
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However, this question was the least traded question in the pilot market. The Pittsburgh 
Steelers were favored to win by more than five points. Perhaps the traders thought the 
contract was already appropriately priced. Nonetheless, we suspect that interest in the 
prediction market had waned by this point and traders simply were not actively trading 
anymore. 
Furthermore, trading on this question remained open throughout the game and for 
one hour following the game; leaving the market open provided an opportunity for 
guaranteed profits, as the price for Pittsburgh remained at $60.44 even though the payoff 
would be $100 per share for a Pittsburgh victory. Although the football game had four 
lead changes and ultimately was decided in overtime, no traders conducted in-game 
trades; moreover, no traders exploited the guaranteed after-game profit potential. In the 
traders‘ defense, the game ended around 11:30 pm EDT. Therefore, those traders who 
watched the game likely went to sleep at the conclusion of the game instead of thinking 
about checking to see how well they did in the pilot prediction market or exploring an 
opportunity to make an ex-post trade for guaranteed profit.  
The other two ―fun‖ questions also had poor trading volume. Taken together, 
introducing ―fun‖ questions certainly did not elicit a cycle of engagement, participation, 
and trading as anticipated. Perhaps there was a mismatch in NPS researcher and N1 
member interests. N1 participation may have been better if we had predetermined their 
interests to ask questions they think are fun. 
Data shows that participation was low, especially by the Non-NPS and Non-N104 
participants, where only 11 of 35 potential participants actually made trades. Because 
trading decreased significantly after the first two weeks, we suspect that interest in the 
prediction market pilot quickly wore off once the novelty was over. Moreover, the traders 
had no real incentive to participate, and we believe this limited interest. Prediction 
markets simply will not work without active participation.  
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D. LESSONS LEARNED WITH SUBSTANTIATING POST-PREDICTION 
MARKET SURVEY RESULTS 
We conducted two anonymous post-market surveys: a ―user‖ survey for those 
who registered and conducted at least one trade, and a ―non-user‖ survey for those who 
did not participate. These surveys featured many multiple-choice questions. Respondents 
were asked to select all applicable responses. The questions and potential responses for 
the two surveys are provided in Appendices A and B.  
The ―user‖ survey asked active participants about their motivations to initially 
trade and sustain trading past the first few weeks, as well as their thoughts regarding 
implementation, operation and outcome of the prediction market experiment. Overall, 12 
of 24 potential respondents completed the ―user‖ survey; 3 of these 12 respondents were 
from NPS. The ―non-user‖ survey was intended for those who were invited to participate 
in the experiment but chose not to do so. We wanted to find out why they chose not to 
participate and what incentives would entice them to participate. In total, 6 of 34 potential 
respondents completed the ―non-user‖ survey. We will list the lessons learned from this 
pilot prediction market. 
1. Participation is Critical for a Prediction Market to be Efficient. 
Furthermore, Incentives are Necessary for People to Participate. 
The active-traders were initially highly motivated to participate due to their 
intrigue in prediction markets. Additionally, 6 of 12 traders claimed a factor in their 
decision to initially participate was that the questions were both relevant and interesting. 
See Figure 3. 
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Figure 3.   Active User Initial Participation Factors 
The motivations for traders to participate past the first few weeks were slightly 
different (see Figure 4). The top factors were still intrigue in prediction markets and the 
draw of relevant and interesting questions. However, the intrigue dropped significantly 
from 11 of 12 to 7 of 12 traders indicating their intrigue in prediction markets was a 
factor in participation. Interestingly, 6 of 12 participants viewed the relevant and 
interesting questions as a factor for their continued participation past the first few weeks. 
Another item of interest is that participants listed competition as an increased factor for 
their continued participation. Nevertheless, the precipitous drop in trading volume after 
the first few weeks suggests that interest in competition waned. One would expect trading 
volume to increase if a competitive spirit had emerged and the traders did not believe the 
markets were appropriately priced.  
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Figure 4.   Factors for Active User Continued Participation 
A prediction market would work best if every organizational member were a self-
selected participant who would work to discover and share his or her information. If this 
were the case, incentives would not be necessary. The reality is that most people will not 
do this. It is obvious that monetary gain provides a natural participatory motivation in 
real money markets. In play money markets, other participation incentives are likely 
needed to attract and sustain participation. 
Figure 5 shows the factors leading to declining participation past the first few 
weeks of the pilot prediction market. Four of 12 active participants indicated that either 
lack of incentive or time caused their trading volume to decline after the first few weeks. 
Furthermore, only 1 of the 12 attributed their trading volume decrease to a belief that 
market questions were appropriately priced and had reached equilibrium. Thus, evidence 
suggests that incentives are necessary for traders to overcome time constraints to register 
and sustain participation.   
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Figure 5.   Active User Reasons for Decline in Trading Volume Past the First few 
Weeks 
Given our pre-survey belief that incentives play a role in participation, we asked a 
question in both the ―user‖ and ―non-user‖ survey on what incentives would motivate 
traders to participate in a future Navy-sponsored prediction market. We provided a list of 
tangible and intangible incentives for respondents to choose from and gave them the 
opportunity to enter ―Other‖ preferences in a free text area. Figure 6 shows the results for 
active-users. They displayed an affinity for tangible rewards, such as cash prizes or an 
iPod. Interestingly, 2 of 12 respondents indicated they would participate with no 
incentives. In addition, 3 of 6 ―Other‖ responses indicated that the subjects were happy to 
participate with no incentives but their participation may have increased if a tangible 
prize were offered. The remaining three textual responses were singular votes for tangible 
prizes, special liberty and no incentives required.  
  68 
 
Figure 6.   Active-User Incentive Preferences 
Figure 7 presents the non-user responses to the same question. One non-user 
indicated that no incentives would be necessary for him/her to participate in a future 
Navy prediction market. The non-user responses to the incentive question were 
dominated by the ―Other‖ response. One non-user indicated he/she would participate if 
he were given paid time off from work—even just a few hours. The remaining 
respondents who selected ―Other‖ did not answer the question directly and expressed 
frustration in the free text area regarding technical issues, account setup, uninteresting 
questions and ambiguity with the concept. Interestingly though, none of the non-users 
indicated they would not participate in a future prediction market. 
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Figure 7.   Non-User Incentive Preferences 
Despite the explicit preference for tangible prizes from both the active- and non-
users, there are several reasons to believe that social rewards may induce participation 
more effectively. The primary reason is that expected monetary or other rewards have a 
low relative value compared to the time and energy expended to discover new 
information and make trades (Cowgill, 2007). Moreover, neither profit maximizing 
companies nor thrifty government organizations expend the resources to make these 
tangible rewards worth their employees‘ time to fully engage in the prediction market and 
meet the requirements of their individual jobs. An organization may be able to foster 
competition between employees or organizational divisions to create a culture that values 
top individual and divisional trader bragging rights. Organizations may be able to curtail 
tangible incentives once this type of culture is in place. For suggestions on how to foster 
this type of culture, Bo Cowgill provides excellent insight into how Google was able to 
develop a culture in which employees value their reputation as top traders more than 
monetary rewards.16  
                                                 
16 This is a frequent topic for Bo Cowgill. One transcript regarding this subject may be found at: 
http://www.midasoracle.org/2007/04/11/how-prediction-exchanges-can-best-encourage-
participation/#comments. 
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2. Participant Selection should be more Inclusive than Exclusive. 
A diverse and broad pool of prediction market participants is optimal. As 
discussed many times in this paper, it is impossible for the organization to determine 
exactly who has useful knowledge. The active-users were more inclusive than exclusive 
when expressing their opinion of what groups of people should be included in future 
Navy N1 prediction markets. When asked, ―What group(s) of Navy personnel should be 
included in future N1 prediction markets to help better aggregate force-structure 
information,‖ respondents overwhelmingly agreed that recruiters, manpower analysts, 
and budget analysts should be involved. The single ―Other‖ response was a free text 
opinion that ―any and all people connected with Navy MPT&E‖ should participate. Refer 
to Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8.   Active-User Opinion Regarding Which Groups of N1 Members should be 
Included in Future Navy N1 Prediction Markets 
How does an organization know who or how many people should participate? It is 
easy to say that an organization should be more inclusive than exclusive. However, as a 
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practical consideration it is clear that not every individual needs to participate in a 
prediction market, especially in very large organizations such as the Navy. The location 
of that dividing line is an open question.  
There is not a specific ratio of people who should (or should not) participate. 
Rather the organization must weigh the costs and expected benefits of implementing the 
prediction market. Using this as a guide, the costs should not exceed the expected benefit. 
The decision of whether to conduct a prediction market and who should participate is 
driven by these factors: 
 Fixed Costs: 
o Management and support costs 
o Cost of tangible incentives 
 Variable Costs: 
o Participant‘s time spent training (this will vary by labor rate and the 
length of the training program) 
o Participant‘s time spent trading (this will vary by labor rate and time 
spent trading) 
 One way to limit this cost is to restrict trading to specific days or 
times 
o Interface costs if using a commercial service (usually a per user fee per 
month) 
3. Thorough Group Training should be Provided to Potential Prediction 
Market Participants to Explain the Prediction Market Concept and 
its Organizational Purpose and Intent.  
In the post-market survey, non-users were asked what factors affected their 
decision not to participate in the pilot market. Refer to Figure 9 for potential responses 
and results. Two of 6 respondents indicated they did not understand the concept or intent 
or did not participate because of technical issues. A group training session could also 
include the account setup for the chosen prediction market interface. The group training 
would provide fewer excuses for people not to participate with the participants‘ accounts 
setup and any technological hurdles addressed.  
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Figure 9.   Non-user Participation Factors 
The training would also provide an opportunity for senior leaders to sponsor the 
prediction market concept. The N1 leadership may have inadvertently undermined the 
prediction market experiment by simply forwarding the introductory emails from NPS 
students vice sending the emails as if coming directly from an N1 senior leader. In fact, 3 
of 6 non-users indicated they thought the prediction market experiment was simply an 
NPS student thesis project, whereas none of the active users felt this way. Conversely, 10 
of 12 active users thought the experiment was a joint N1 and NPS thesis project; the 
remaining two perceived the experiment as an N1 initiative. Our surveys showed that 
executive sponsorship is of the utmost importance to ensure prediction market 
participation.  
The training should also include a tutorial regarding trading strategies. The goal is 
to educate participants about long and short selling strategies along with their advantages 
and disadvantages. The Inkling interface made short selling extremely user friendly, such 
that traders may not have fully understood the concept even though they thought they did. 
However, nine of 12 active users indicated that they understood the concept of short 
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selling. We cannot determine whether they fully understood the concept or if the Inkling 
interface made short selling so easy that participants thought they understood it.  
4. When Attempting to Forecast an Organizational Metric, Develop a 
Complete Understanding of what is Being Measured and from Where 
the Data/Results Come.  
As previously discussed, N1 initially wanted to forecast the Nuke Zone A 
retention rate. With minimal research, we discovered that the candidate question would 
not be very useful in a prediction market at that time, as the Navy had temporarily 
suspended re-enlistment bonuses.  
5. Properly Phrasing Prediction Market Questions is a Challenging Task 
that Requires Great Care.  
It is very easy to introduce ambiguity in a question with haphazard phrasing. For 
example, we published a market with the following phrasing: Will the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average (INDU) close above 9,400 by COB on Friday, Aug. 14, 2009? (It had 
closed at 9,370 on Aug. 7, 2009 when the weeklong market was introduced). Instead, we 
meant to ask the following: Will the Dow Jones Industrial Average close above 9,400 on 
Friday, August 14, 2009, at COB? The published phrasing provided an opportunity for 
the Dow Jones Industrial Average to eclipse 9,400 each day up to August 14, 2009. 
Hence, we were forced to closely monitor the conclusion of the stock market each day in 
the event the Dow Jones Industrial Average closed above 9,400. If this condition were 
met, we would have preemptively closed and paid out the market before the intended 
closing date of August 14, 2009. 
We faced two additional challenges with phrasing. One challenge was jargon 
ambiguity. The N1 jargon was the Nuke Zone A retention rate. We simply did not 
understand the rules for determining whether a Nuke was in Zone A (or another zone). 
Secondly, the Inkling interface limited the question length to 140 characters for Twitter 
integration. This 140 character constraint made it very difficult for us to ask complicated 
questions. We generally used the Market Information text box to provide supplemental 
details. Unfortunately, the Market Information text box appeared at the bottom of the 
webpage and may not have been obvious to participants.  
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Despite these challenges, we were pleased to find out the drop off in participation 
was not because of poorly phrased questions. In fact, 11 of 12 active users felt the 
prediction market questions were somewhat or very clear. 
6. Running a Prediction Market takes Time and Effort.  
This may seem an obvious statement but the point should not be taken lightly. 
Our recommendation is to outsource the initial market setup. There are many decisions in 
the initial setup that affect the market‘s success. After the market is established, one 
person could easily manage accounts and technical issues as a collateral duty. However, 
it would be unwise to task one person to generate interesting, yet unambiguous questions. 
Perhaps the most difficult task was to generate, formulate, and vet questions for 
all possible trader interpretations. It would be very difficult for a single person to 
consider how different participants may interpret the prediction market questions. Even 
with three to five people reviewing each question before publication, we still ended up 
with at least one poorly worded question. We recommend that a group of approximately 
three to five middle-management personnel perform this task. This group should publish 
questions and monitor trader comments for possible confusion. If necessary, they should 
suspend trading and refund participants to pre-trade levels. In addition, the members of 
this group need to ensure they fully understand how the outcome is measured and 
whether the pay-off is clear. 
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VIII. NAVY-SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR PREDICTION 
MARKET UTILIZATION 
Navy decision makers need all available useful information to make informed 
decisions. An efficient and effective information aggregation tool may prove invaluable 
to Navy decision makers considering the gravity of the decisions they must make. It is 
important, however, to consider both the benefits and the limitations of prediction 
markets that most-directly affect Navy utilization of prediction markets. 
A. BENEFITS 
Generally, the prediction market benefits and limitations discussed in Chapter III 
hold true for Navy prediction markets. The dynamic nature and potential for accessing 
the collective organizational information are among the most important and desirable 
benefits of prediction markets. 
The dynamic nature of prediction markets can help Navy decision makers 
overcome common organizational challenges. For instance, in some Navy commands, 
decision makers do not have adequate access to much of the organization‘s existing 
knowledge. Moreover, they simply may not know it exists, or may not know whom to ask 
for the information they seek. The Navy is too large an organization and too complex for 
any single individual to fully grasp the details and inner workings of each level of 
operation. This adverse characteristic unfortunately translates down to the command level 
as well. For instance, when tracking progress on an acquisition program, such as the Joint 
Strike Fighter, no one individual can identify, understand, and maintain every detail 
associated with that program. Therefore, middle-level managers collect and manage 
information in a departmentalized way. However, information often is lost in translation 
and transmission upward through chains-of-command. Prediction markets would allow 
Navy decision makers to easily query the whole organization to aggregate the specific 
information spread across the entire organization.  
Another challenge Navy decision makers face is that some organizational 
information is lost over time. Information can be lost because some people do not have 
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the incentive or wherewithal to reveal it to appropriate decision makers; additionally, 
tacit knowledge is almost certainly lost as military members continuously rotate in and 
out of Navy commands. Easily accessible prediction markets can provide a means for 
retrieving such information that normally would be lost.   
Prediction markets may provide a further benefit to the Navy because of their 
ability to aggregate useful information in an anonymous manner. It is always easy for 
employees to trumpet pleasant information to their superiors, but many employees, 
especially middle management, find it difficult to share negative information, resulting in 
uninformed senior leadership. Anonymous prediction markets offer a solution for sharing 
unpleasant information and removing the middle management bias by giving lower-level 
individuals a mechanism to share their insight and perspective, without fear of middle 
management reprisal. 
B. LIMITATIONS 
The Navy also must consider prediction market limitations to make a sound 
judgment on whether and when to utilize prediction markets. We believe participatory 
challenges and organizational/cultural barriers are the limitations most likely to affect the 
success of Navy-sponsored prediction markets. These, in turn, would have implications 
on the markets that can be used. Each challenge is discussed below. 
1. Participatory Challenges 
We believe there are three primary reasons the Navy will face participatory 
challenges when utilizing prediction markets. First, the Navy‘s prediction market claims 
will be highly specialized—such as claims on endstrength, re-enlistment bonuses, 
recruiting goals and other issues that are not common to the layperson—and they will 
require a degree of Navy-specific knowledge for individuals to trade with any expertise. 
As a result, most potential participants may feel disadvantaged in a given market since 
they believe other traders possess either privileged information or greater specialization, 
while they themselves do not. Second, the Navy is limited in the rewards it may offer 
traders for their participation. Various legal and ethical barriers may preclude the Navy 
from using monetary or nonmonetary compensation; yet, incentives are essential for 
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ensuring market participants remain actively engaged. Finally, traders may believe that 
their participation is futile or irrelevant since market parameters can easily change. 
Decision makers can affect prediction markets by changing policies or conditions that are 
directly associated with a given market; when this occurs, trader positions can be 
undermined within the affected market. 
a. Perceived Disadvantage 
As mentioned above, Navy prediction markets often deal with very 
specific items of concern. As such, traders may need to possess relevant specialized 
information. Additionally, some traders may have unique access to critical or sensitive 
information relative to a prediction market, and some may have earlier access than others 
to market information.  
Although, the nature of prediction markets requires a degree of insider 
trading to reveal information, the detriment comes when only a few individuals have 
insight to the relevant market information. When this occurs, the majority of the 
participation pool is considered uninformed, and the informed traders can exploit their 
insider positions. Insider trading is outlawed in public stock markets to protect non-
insiders. Yet, it is difficult to make similar regulations for prediction markets.   
Participants believing others have a significant advantage (due to access to 
information) may avoid trading because of their perceived position of inferiority within a 
given market. As such, certain Navy markets—such as those pertaining to recruiting 
goals or endstrength—will likely have a very thin and specific participant pool.  
One such case occurred within our prediction market experiment 
involving the Navy endstrength. Two traders from N104 posted weekly updates of 
current Navy force strength levels. This led some traders to believe that these individuals, 
if not others, had early access to critical information. Moreover, one NPS trader explicitly 
indicated that he felt he was at a significant disadvantage because other people had this 
early access to the current force numbers. It so happens that this was the most-heavily 
traded market in terms of total active traders and total trades. This may reflect that this 
particular market was the first market introduced to all our participants, so it was up and 
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running when traders were still active. Of note, roughly 50 of 70 total trades within the 
endstrength market occurred after the N104 weekly forecast updates first began. 
Therefore, had other participants drawn the same conclusion as the NPS trader, this 
particular market would have experienced significantly less trading activity and 
participation. 
b. The Navy is Limited in the Incentives it can Offer  
Prediction market participation often hinges directly on participation 
incentives. Because legal restrictions and concerns over public perception likely preclude 
the Navy from using real money prediction markets, it will have to incentivize 
participation while using play money markets. In addition, it is unlikely that the Navy 
could elicit participation via certain hard incentives, such as monetary rewards. Such 
incentives might raise public concerns on the proper and ethical use of government 
money. A secondary concern may be that some cash rewards could shift Navy prediction 
market participants‘ loyalties and focus them away from their primary duties and toward 
their participation and engagement in Navy prediction markets. This last concern is 
explained more fully below in the section discussing organizational/cultural barriers.  
c. Parameters May Change 
It is important to note that managerial decisions can drastically affect an 
open market regardless of whether such decisions depend on that market‘s current 
forecasting assessment. Herein lies the dilemma: organizational leaders want to use 
prediction markets as a forecasting tool to enhance their decision-making process; 
however, actions taken or decisions made by these leaders can significantly affect open 
markets and their associated assessments, potentially undermining trader positions. Thus, 
some traders may be less inclined to participate in markets they believe to be overly 
susceptible to influence through management decisions. As a result, participation may 
wane in certain Navy markets. 
For instance, imagine the Navy wishes to establish a market to determine 
if it will meet its recruiting goal in a period when the economy is growing. When the 
economy is growing, the Navy has a more difficult time reaching its recruiting goals. 
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Nevertheless, the Navy typically meets its recruiting goals by making appropriate 
management decisions. Some common decisions are to raise enlistment bonuses, lower 
Armed Forces Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) score requirements, issue more 
conduct waivers (allowing those with a criminal history to enlist), or raise the recruit 
maximum age requirement. If Navy decision makers perceive they are not reaching 
recruiting goals, they would make necessary changes to enlistment incentives or 
standards, changing the parameters for any prediction market.  
This may limit participation for two reasons. First, the likelihood that the 
Navy will do what it takes to meet its goals (for recruiting or retention) could make a 
market uninteresting to some potential traders. On the other hand, some may invest in the 
prediction market based on that belief. One case from our prediction market experiment 
highlights this. Numerous traders participated in the market: ―What will be the Navy‘s 
endstrength (for officers and enlisted personnel) for FY2009?‖ Although only one trader 
offered a reason for conducting trades in the manner that he/she did, that one trader 
stated: ―Meeting endstrength is a high priority -- the Navy makes [sic] it happen.‖ In this 
instance, it is clear that the trader believed the Navy would take action(s) to ensure the 
established endstrength goal was met, and therefore conducted a market trade as a result 
of this belief. 
Second, participation may be limited because the changed parameters may 
undermine traders‘ positions. For example, a trader may have believe that the economy is 
going to be stronger (and thus the recruiting environment will be more difficult) than 
most people think, but they may be hesitant to invest in an outcome based on this belief 
knowing that the Navy may change the parameters (e.g., raise enlistment bonuses) to 
meet the end-goal. Many individuals in the Navy believe the Navy will act to ensure they 
meet established goals. Therefore, potential traders may be less likely to participate in a 
market associated with a goal open to managerial influence. This concern does not apply 
to all outcomes, but it applies to outcomes such as recruiting and retention.   
In markets with outcomes for which the Navy can change the underlying 
parameters, incorporating specific market rules to accommodate unexpected managerial 
parameter changes may alleviate traders‘ concerns. One common rule pays traders at the 
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time of any major policy change that could affect the prediction market outcome. Such a 
rule must be in place and communicated clearly to all potential participants prior to and 
during a given market‘s open period. This ensures that all participants are aware of the 
potential for change and that an identifiable contingency is in place for such change.  
As a consequence of potentially limited participation from these problems, 
the Navy is susceptible to thin markets. If the potential participant pool is small, an 
automated market maker is necessary to promote liquidity and avoid high person-to-
person bid/ask spreads.
17
 As discussed earlier, thin markets are not a preferred condition 
for prediction markets. Moreover, automated market makers are not necessarily desirable, 
as they inject an unwanted element of artificiality into the markets.
18
 
To conclude, participatory challenges will affect the Navy‘s ability to 
usefully employ some prediction markets. These challenges include each of the 
following: 1) some traders perceive themselves to be at a disadvantage relative to other 
traders who may possess privileged information, 2) the Navy is limited in the incentives 
it can offer, and 3) prediction market parameters may change. Each of these issues could 
affect a potential trader‘s desire to participate in a given prediction market, and each can 
ultimately cause overall participation levels to decrease. Furthermore, each of the 
participatory challenges can lead to thinner markets. As a result of thin markets, the Navy 
likely would have to use some market maker to promote liquidity throughout the markets. 
Unfortunately, market makers can inject artificiality into markets. 
2. Organizational / Cultural Barriers 
In addition to participatory challenges, the Navy may have great barriers to 
overcome in terms of its organizational structure and culture. Strong-rooted, hierarchical 
organizations such as the Navy may be less inclined to adopt and embrace prediction 
markets without skepticism and resistance from many people throughout the chain-of-
                                                 
17 As discussed in Chapter V, automated market makers act as a universal buyer/seller to permit trades 
to occur without requiring direct trader-to-trader interactions. 
18 As mentioned earlier, the way in market makers conduct their calculations often is based on the 
market manager‘s arbitrary assignment of specific values within the market maker‘s root formulas. As a 
result, the market maker artificially approximates the market‘s supply and demand equilibrium, resulting in 
a correlated security price—instead of the new market price simply being set by the lowest asking price. 
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command; individuals generally oppose change within such organizations because they 
routinely and frequently experience change with senior leaders rotating in and out of 
command positions. Furthermore, there stands to be a blemish on senior decision makers‘ 
records if they take acions that oppose fulfilled beliefs of the collective prediction market 
group. In other words, if the group believes a given event will occur, and its belief is 
contrary to the opinion of senior Navy leaders, then the senior leaders may appear inept if 
the event actually occurs according to the group‘s forecasted belief. Tom Davenport of 
Babson College elaborates: 
The barriers to adoption of prediction markets are primarily cultural . . . . 
Let's say that your company runs a prediction market on first-year sales of 
a new product, and the results come out not so positively. Let's say that the 
employees who participate predict much lower sales than, say, the product 
manager for the new product, the division president, and the CEO. . . . The 
crowd has made the hierarchy look bad, and the hierarchy doesn't 
generally like to look bad. (Davenport, 2008) 
Because of this potential problem, prediction markets likely will be most effective 
and welcomed in Navy commands that have particularly strong leaders, who are open to 
change and readily acknowledge they are not always capable of making the best 
decisions without the aid of their subordinates and colleagues. 
Aside from the issue of professional image, other organizational barriers may 
exist. Some employees may work in a position that affords them an opportunity to affect 
a given prediction market. Worse yet, some employees may work in a position that 
allows them to affect organizational operations because of personal interest in a given 
prediction market. Individuals in this sort of position likely have excellent insight to offer 
the market as a whole. However, the potential consequences of participation by these 
people raise more questions that Navy decision makers must consider prior to 
implementing prediction markets:  
 Should individuals (or teams) with such positions be permitted to 
participate in the market? 
 Should their participation in the market be limited or controlled? 
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 Is there another way to work their knowledge into the market without 
risking a conflict of interest? 
These questions and challenges create a serious quandary for any organization, 
but the nature of the Navy‘s work makes them ever more important and challenging. 
C. WHEN NOT TO USE PREDICTION MARKETS 
There are several conditions for which prediction markets probably would not add 
any value to current forecasting techniques. The first condition is when outcomes have a 
high degree of predictability. There is little advantage to using a prediction market to 
predict events that are highly predictable. The organization should simply rely on 
historical data and patterns to forecast these events. In our market, one trader commented 
on the enlisted accession goal question that the Navy would do what it takes to meet their 
retention goal. He intuitively knew that they would make a management decision to 
change parameters to meet the enlisted accession goal.  
Prediction markets may offer a benefit to the Navy when historical data is limited, 
erratic, or unreliable—under such conditions, statistical and econometric forecasting 
methods generally cannot provide accurate forecasts. 
The second condition rendering prediction markets less useful is when there is 
limited dispersed information to aggregate or market participants cannot retrieve existing 
information. The point of a prediction market is to aggregate available information from 
amongst its participants. If information does not exist, participants do not possess 
relevant information or participants cannot retrieve existing information then the 
prediction market cannot function. Furthermore, if traders attempted to participate in a 
market that is incapable of aggregating information because of the condition above, the 
collective market assessment is uncertain, making the assessment unfit for use by 
organizational decision makers. 
The third condition is when there are only a limited number of knowledgeable 
traders. There is no need in using a prediction market to forecast an event when an 
organization can reliably turn to one or a few members for the information. One trader in 
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our prediction market experiment had early access to Navy endstrength numbers. This 
trader shared that information with the rest of the traders and updated the market with 
weekly numbers. As previously mentioned, other people may have opted not to 
participate on this question because they perceived this individual to have insider 
knowledge. 
Prediction markets seem to be a natural fit for determining Navy project 
management and acquisition outcomes, such as determining how a given project‘s 
progress is tracking with respect to all departments, divisions, and subprojects. For 
example, ―When will the Joint Strike Fighter program receive milestone decision 
authority approval to begin full rate production?‖ There appear to be fewer instances 
where prediction markets are appropriate for determining outcomes in the Navy N1 
domain. It seems N1 should have the technology to collect, aggregate and access 
quantifiable information on-demand. 
D. THE WAY FORWARD FOR NAVY PREDICTION MARKET 
APPLICATION 
Prediction markets can be a positive and powerful decision-making resource, and 
they can have a place in Navy forecasting—with strong leadership and a positive 
organizational culture that embraces change and opportunity. However, what we have 
seen to this point is that the challenges and limitations of prediction markets are 
extremely significant, and they may be difficult to overcome.  
Should Navy leadership use prediction markets in a formal and official manner, 
the top levels of the chain-of-command must accept, embrace, and encourage the 
markets. Moreover, leadership must establish a full training initiative to ensure all 
members of the organization understand the purpose of markets, as well as their roles 
within the market. Finally, Navy leadership must fully understand the intricacies of 
prediction markets to employ them properly. Lessons learned from this thesis highlight 
the fact that it is an extremely difficult task to understand what organizational issues or 
concerns are best assessed by prediction markets. For instance, an organization may  
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forecast specific sensitive metrics, such as endstrength, but prediction markets can be 
complicated when forecasting these metrics because of the following additional 
problems: 
 Inconsistencies in organizational or cross-organizational terminology,  
 Misunderstandings or misperceptions among organizational leadership or 
members on what truly is or should be forecasted, and  
 Difficulty in pinpointing the means by which organizations officially 
measure a given metric; it is essential to ensure markets are appropriately 
closed and contract payouts are noncontroversial. 
Based on post-market survey results and lessons learned during this thesis 
research, the following are some manpower outcomes (not considered before in our 
discussions with N1) that could potentially work in a prediction market: 
 Advancement opportunities; 
 Attrition rates—unlike recruiting and retention outcomes, attrition would 
not likely be subject to policy changes; 
 Whether the Navy will change certain recruiting and retention incentives, 
for example: 
o Increase (or decrease) an enlistment bonus 
o Increase (or decrease) SRB‘s for particular ratings 
o Increase (or decrease) the limit on enlistees without a high school 
diploma 
Note that all of these would avoid the problem of management changing policy levers, 
which could undermine traders‘ positions in certain outcomes. 
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IX. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Navy N1 regularly forecasts re-enlistment rates, endstrength, and many other 
force-shaping factors as an input into their resource allocation decision-making process. 
In an effort to improve upon the force-shaping decision-making process, N1 has shown 
interest in using prediction markets to complement or replace alternative methods for 
forecasting various Navy force-shaping elements. We conducted a pilot prediction market 
with N1 personnel as the participants. We subsequently conducted two anonymous post-
prediction market surveys. A ―user‖ survey for those who registered and had at least one 
trade and a ―non-user‖ survey for those who did not participate.  
The aim of this thesis is to act as a foundation for ongoing prediction market 
research within the Department of Defense (DoD). To this end, we answer our research 
questions. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. What are the Key Benefits and Potential Limitations of Prediction 
Markets? 
Prediction markets have a proven record in the corporate context. The key 
benefits of prediction markets include their dynamic nature, accuracy, and potential for 
anonymous revelations. Prediction markets are dynamic; that is, they are capable of 
efficiently aggregating information in a continuous or ongoing manner. Additionally, 
prediction markets are capable of aggregating information with a high degree of 
accuracy; they can quickly pull together information spread across many people and 
places, and the accuracy of the results can rival most any alternative forecasting method 
under optimal conditions. Moreover, prediction markets allow users to express 
anonymous personal opinions and beliefs on specific topics; this encourages feedback at 
all organizational levels without any fear of management or peer reprisal. 
The chief limitations addressed in this thesis are those associated with 
participation, manipulation, biases, and legal restrictions. Prediction markets require 
some minimum level of participation to avoid stagnation. Without enough active 
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participants, some traders may lose interest and/or incentive to share their information 
with others. Furthermore, manipulation can become a viable concern in prediction 
markets that have little active participation. Additionally, several biases can affect 
trading, and thus accuracy, including: over-optimism, under-pricing extremes, long shot, 
and social judgment. Finally, legal restrictions can limit some organizations‘ ability to 
easily or efficiently implement and manage prediction markets; legal restrictions 
generally have the greatest impact on real money prediction markets, as government 
concerns with gambling and ethics move to the forefront.  
2. What Does the Current Literature and Practical Evidence Suggest 
about Prediction Market use as a Forecasting Tool? 
The current literature highlights practical evidence of prediction market use in 
various industries. Furthermore, it discusses prediction market potential and the arenas 
within which markets should be considered. Some businesses have had notable success 
employing prediction markets. These companies have used internal prediction markets to 
help forecast key events, such as the success of new products, future profitability, or 
mergers/acquisitions within their industry. 
One previously noted example is that of Hewlett-Packard‘s prediction markets 
outperforming traditional printer sales forecasts in 75% of the observances (Hanson, 
2003, p. 107). Additionally, Google has enhanced its management‘s decision-making 
process by using prediction markets to forecast how many consumers will use their 
applications, such as Gmail (Dye, 2008, p. 87). Google has been able to make resource 
allocation decisions, such as server capacity, to support its projected number of users. 
Similarly, pharmaceutical companies have used prediction markets to determine which 
drugs in their experimental process have the best chance for FDA approval. Thus, they 
are able to make resource allocation decisions based on those drugs that have the highest 
probability of successfully making it to market. Finally, Abramowicz (2003) asserts there 
are times to believe prediction markets may provide greater efficiency or objectivity than 
expert forecasters: "It is in governmental decisionmaking [sic], however, where there is 
the greatest reason to be suspicious of experts, either because of external influence or 
because of ideological agendas‖ (pp. 20–21). 
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3. Can Prediction Markets be an Effective Tool for Navy Force-shaping 
Forecasting? 
The current literature, corporate successes, past and present lessons learned, and 
the growth of the prediction market field all indicate that prediction markets could be an 
effective tool for Navy force-shaping forecasting and decision-making. However, results 
of this project‘s experimental prediction market are inconclusive. Several constraints and 
issues caused us to design and implement the experimental market in a less than ideal 
manner. As a result, we can speak very little regarding the accuracy or efficiency of our 
markets. Moreover, issues associated with participant selection, ongoing participation, 
and perceptions of ownership reinforced the researchers‘ preconceived belief that certain 
cultural and organizational hurdles may adversely affect the development and 
implementation of an official Navy prediction market.  
The researchers still believe that prediction markets can be a positive and 
powerful decision-making resource, and they can have a place in Navy forecasting—with 
a positive organizational culture that embraces change and opportunity. However, what 
we have seen to this point, as indicated by post-market survey results, is that several 
individuals elected not to participate because they did not understand the markets‘ 
purpose and intent, lacked time or incentives to participate, were uninterested, or did not 
believe the markets were spearheaded by Navy organizational leadership. To be sure, 
these issues are not a negative reflection upon prediction markets or upon any members 
associated with the design, implementation, or conduct of the markets. Rather, such 
issues are an expected byproduct of the research and experimental process. 
The aforementioned issues, highlighted by the post-market survey, speak more 
directly to underlying issues of organizational culture and proper training. More effective 
training might have curbed some of the sentiments expressed in the post-market survey. 
Additionally, the Navy, as well as most governmental organizations, is known for having 
a strong and unique culture steeped in tradition and heritage. There are, however, some 
commonly known and experienced negative effects associated with such a culture, and 
the inability to easily accept and embrace change is one.  
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Should Navy leadership choose to use prediction markets in a formal and official 
manner, the top levels of the chain-of-command must accept, embrace, and encourage the 
markets. Moreover, leadership must emplace a full training initiative to ensure all 
members of the organization understand the markets‘ purpose, as well as their role(s) 
within the market. Finally, Navy leadership must fully understand the intricacies of 
prediction markets to employ them properly. Lessons learned from this thesis highlight 
the extreme difficulty to understand what organizational issues or concerns are best 
assessed by prediction markets. More specifically, an organization may forecast specific 
sensitive metrics, such as endstrength, but prediction markets can be complicated when 
attempting to forecast these metrics because of several problems: 
 Inconsistencies in organizational or cross-organizational terminology,  
 Misunderstandings or misperceptions among organizational leadership or 
members on what truly is or should be forecasted, and  
 Difficulties in pinpointing the means by which organizations officially 
measure a given metric, while ensuring markets are appropriately closed 
and contract payouts are noncontroversial. 
4. In what Areas should the Navy Consider using a Prediction Market? 
Since the results of the experimental prediction market are inconclusive, one 
cannot say with certainty how the Navy should use prediction markets. Moreover, this 
thesis is the first of several to examine the potential for Navy prediction markets. 
Subsequent theses will focus more on practical applications and developments to meet 
the Navy‘s real-world needs. Thus, the results of those theses should be more conclusive 
and offer greater insight in this respect. 
In addition, it is worth reiterating major participatory challenges the Navy will 
face in using prediction markets, as discussed in Chapter VIII. First, the Navy‘s 
prediction market claims will be highly specialized—such as claims on endstrength, re-
enlistment bonuses, recruiting goals and other issues that are not common to the 
layperson—and they will require a degree of expertise for individuals to trade with any 
certainty within a given Navy market. As a result, potential participants may perceive that 
they are at a disadvantage in a market because other traders possess either privileged 
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information or the necessary degree of specialization, while they themselves do not. 
Second, traders may believe that their participation is futile or irrelevant since market 
parameters can easily change. Decision makers can affect prediction markets by changing 
policies or conditions that are directly associated with a given market; when this occurs, 
trader positions are undermined within the affected market. Therefore, the Navy should 
avoid using prediction markets for predicting outcomes that have parameters that are 
likely to change.  
In light of the major challenges facing prediction market utilization, the Navy can 
utilize prediction markets to forecast many issues of concern. The key to successfully 
employing the markets lies in designing effective and measurable market contracts 
pertaining to the issue(s) of concern, developing a useful participation pool, and eliciting 
ongoing participation. Employed properly, prediction markets should be able to assist 
decision makers in most issues of concern. 
Post-market survey results offer some specific examples of key forecasting issues 
for which the Navy might consider utilizing prediction markets. In addition to 
endstrength and annual enlisted accession goals, as covered by this thesis‘s experiment, 
survey respondents cited the following specific Navy issues for future prediction markets: 
advancement opportunity, retention rates, and attrition rates. The following are some 
manpower outcomes we believe could potentially work in a prediction market: 
 Advancement opportunities; 
 Attrition rates—unlike recruiting and retention outcomes, attrition would 
not likely be subject to policy changes; 
 Whether the Navy will change certain recruiting and retention incentives, 
for example: 
o Increase (or decrease) an enlistment bonus 
o Increase (or decrease) SRB‘s for particular ratings 
o Increase (or decrease) the limit on enlistees without a high school 
diploma 
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5. In Conducting a Pilot Prediction Market, What Lessons Learned can 
we Provide to the Navy Regarding the Design, Implementation, and 
Utilization of Prediction Markets? 
Participation is, perhaps, the most critical and challenging aspect of prediction 
market implementation and conduct. Traders need to be induced into participating in a 
prediction market, especially when the participant pool is small. With a large potential 
participant pool, a low participation rate is not necessarily bad. An efficient market, 
rather, depends upon a critical mass of active traders. If an organization with limited 
potential participants introduces a prediction market, a higher participation rate is more 
critical than in an organization with a larger potential participant pool. In any case, 
participant selection should be more inclusive than exclusive. It is important to include 
people from varying organizational levels and departments so the prediction market may 
incorporate the information afforded them by their unique perspectives.   
Additionally, there is no such thing as a ―one-size-fits-all‖ design for all 
organizations. As described in Chapter V, there are many considerations when 
determining what type of market is most useful, given organizational preferences and 
parameters. The primary considerations are: 
 How large is the potential participant pool? 
 What type of information is the organization forecasting?  
If the potential participant pool is small, an automated market maker is necessary 
to promote liquidity and avoid high person-to-person bid/ask spreads. Additionally, the 
organization‘s selection of a market mechanism should depend on the type of information 
the organization desires to forecast. If an organization is forecasting mutually exclusive 
or discrete outcomes, MSR is an appropriate mechanism. However, MSR does not allow 
organizations to forecast continuous organizational metrics; the CDA or DPM 
mechanisms are more appropriate when organizations want to pinpoint a continuous 
number.  
Group training is necessary, as it can preclude or mitigate confusion or doubt 
among potential participants. Specifically, organizations should use group training for the 
following reasons: to introduce potential participants to the prediction market interface 
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and demonstrate its site navigation, to inform participants of various trading strategies, 
such as short selling, and to display executive sponsorship. If the training includes 
account setup and interface introduction, participants will have fewer reasons for not 
participating. Furthermore, group training may provide an opportunity to preemptively 
boost participation by challenging people to compete against one another.  
Prediction market administration requires a great deal of time and effort, and it is 
complicated by subtleties such as question phrasing. It is difficult to develop useful and 
measurable organizational questions. Additionally, the prediction market experiment 
proved it challenging to phrase questions unambiguously so people with varied 
backgrounds all understand the true intent of the question asked. It is equally challenging 
to derive comparative forecasts to measure the relative accuracy of the prediction market 
forecasts. Each of these challenges translates into additional administrator time and effort 
to manage a market. Moreover, marketplace administration should not be tasked to one, 
or even two people. Ideally, organizations should designate a small group of people to 
manage and administer the marketplace—the size of the group will depend on the 
questions involved, as well as the nature of information sought. 
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APPENDIX A: ACTIVE-USER SURVEY 
Question 
number 
Questions to Ask Suggested Question 
Type 
Responses 




Rate one item on a 









2 Did you feel you 
had expertise in 
the Navy-specific 
market questions? 
Yes/No/Uncertain   
3 What group(s) of 
Navy personnel 
should be included 
in future N1 
prediction markets 





multiple choice  
Select all that apply: 




4 What factors 





Select all that apply: 
Management influence 
Peer pressure 
Comments optional Relevant/interesting questions 
Intrigue in Prediction Markets 
Confidence in my information 
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Select all that apply: 
Weekly email update 
Management influence 
Peer pressure 
Comments optional Relevant/interesting questions 
Intrigue in Prediction Markets 
Confidence in my information 




6 If you made early 
trades but reduced 
your trading 





Select all that apply: 
Not applicable 
Felt questions achieved market 
equilibrium 
Lack of time 
Comments optional Lack of incentive 
Uninterested 
Questions were not 
relevant/interesting 
Lack of confidence in anonymity or 
user rights protection 




7 What incentives 
would cause you 





Select all that apply: 
None 
Preferred parking spot 
Lunch with VIP 
Comments optional Movie tickets 
Top trader t-shirt 
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8 What other Navy 
topics would you 
find interesting to 
try to predict using 
a prediction 
market? 
Free text   
9 Do you believe 
you understand the 
concept of short-
selling (selling 
shares you don't 
have, believing 
that a category is 
priced too high)? 
Yes/No/Uncertain    
10 Based upon your 
experience with 
your prediction 
market, would you 
participate in a 
future prediction 
market? 
Yes/No/Uncertain   
Why or why not?                                                             
Comment required 
11 What was your 
understanding for 




multiple choice                                                           
Comments optional 
Select one:                                                                     
NPS Thesis Project                                                 
N1 Initiative                                                            
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Question Type Responses 





select    
Select all that apply: 
Lack of time 
Lack of incentive 
Uninterested 
Comments optional Questions were not relevant/interesting 
Lack of confidence in anonymity or user 
rights protection 















Select all that apply: 
None 
Preferred parking spot 
Lunch with VIP 
Movie tickets 
Comments optional Top trader t-shirt 











Single-choice multiple select Select one: 
NPS Thesis Project 
N1 Initiative 
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